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Abs tract
Economists increasingly have become involved in the development
and use of statistical models for the analysis of duration data. This
thesis consists of three chapters which relate to the specification
and application of these models to the study of economic phenomena.
In chapter 1, I analyze the determinants of retirement in a
competing risk framework, and find that distinguishing between full
and partial retirement is important if one wishes to understand the
factors influencing the decision to retire. In particular, the Social
Security system affects full and partial retirement probabilitites
differentially. Chapter 2 consists of an analysis of the duration of
unemployment spells. Using a newly developed data source I find that
there is mixed support for a simple search interpretation of spell
duration. The evidence suggests that a more general framework is
required. In chapter 3, I extend the regression form of the
proportional hazards model to the case where covariates are allowed to
vary over time. I demonstrate identification and asymptotic normality
of the general estimator for both single and competing risks models.
The results in this thesis address specific questions regarding
Social Security and unemployment insurance as well as issues relating
to the general use of duration models in explaining economic
phenomena. The framework of analysis used in this thesis should
profitably extend to a number of areas of future research.
Thesis Supervisors: Jerry A. Hausman, Professor of Economics
James M. Poterba, Associate Professor of Economics
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Introduction
Economists increasingly have become involved in the development
and use of techniques for the analysis of duration data. Duration,
or hazard, models provide a convenient framework for examining
economic phenomena which relate to the length of time before an event
occurs. This thesis consists of three chapters which involve the use
of hazard models in economics.
The first two chapters are comprised of empirical analyses using
semi-parametric techniques for the estimation of competing risks
models. In the first chapter, I analyze the factors influencing the
number of years to retirement and the form, full or partial, that the
intitial retirement takes. The second chapter considers the factors
that affect unemployment spell durations and whether exit is via
recall or a new job finding. In the third chapter, I demonstrate
identification and asymptotic normality for an estimator which
generalizes previous semi-parametric estimators to allow for
explanatory variables which change over time. The development of
this estimator continues the effort, initiated by others, directed at
finding a unified framework for the analysis of duration data.
In chapter 1 I examine the relationship between Social Security
and retirement behavior. Empirical analyses of retirement typically
assume a single form of retirement. There is evidence, however, that
-7 -
a substantial proportion of individuals exit from full time work via
a partial reduction in work effort. To the extent that behavior
differs across retirement type, then single form of retirement models
are likely to convolute the influences of various factors upon the
two forms of retirement. If, for example, the receipt of Social
Security benefits has differential effects by type of retirement,
then the single form model will not accurately capture the impact of
benefits upon behavior.
To account for the existence of partial retirement, I use a
competing risks model of full and partial retirement to analyze
retirement decisions. The individual level data are drawn from a
sample of Longitudinal Retirement History Survey individuals. Based
upon parameter estimates from this specification, I find evidence
that single form of retirement models convolute the influence of
variables. Additional Social Security benefits are found to increase
the probabilities of retirement differentially across retirement
type, encouraging full retirement more than partial retirement. A
similar result is observed for increases in benefit levels resulting
from additional work which lower the relative probability of partial
retirement.
The second chapter addresses the impact of unemployment
insurance upon the duration of spells of unemployment. Despite
considerable advance in both economic theory and econometric
technique, much of the existing empirical work on the subject has
- 8 -
been handicapped by data limitations which hamper the study of a
variety of issues. In this chapter, I consider jointly the issue of
the impact of UI benefits upon exit from spells of unemployment and
the form in which the exit occurs. The primary contribution of the
chapter is the development of a new sample of unemployment spells
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation which allows for
the estimation of a competing risk model of recall or new job finding
and which addresses a number of data problems.
I find that unemployment benefits and the exhaustion of benefits
are important factors in influencing hazard rates. There is mixed
support in the data for a search model of new job finding. While the
overall hazard is estimated to be a decreasing function of duration,
the new job hazard for exit from unemployment appears to be
increasing over time, but not monotonically. The relative importance
of unemployment insurance in affecting the hazards for recall is a
result that is beyond the scope of search models to explain and
suggests the need for more general models of unemployment durations.
These results, along with the finding of a large number of multiple
spell individuals, indicate that the recent concern with the duration
of single spell unemployment is somewhat missplaced.
The final chapter builds upon the previous literature on
semi-parametric hazard models by extending the regression form of the
proportional hazards model to time-varying covariates. Recent
econometric research on proportional hazards models has focused on
- 9 -
estimation methods which do not require functional form restrictions
on the form of the baseline hazard. Unfortunately, those techniques
based upon the regression form of the likelihood have, to date, been
restricted to the special case of covariates which do not vary over
time.
I demonstrate identification and asymptotic normality of the
general estimator for single and competing risks models with
time-varying covariates. The proofs borrow heavily from the existing
literature on hazard models and discrete choice estimators. In the
course of demonstrating the properties of the estimator, I take
advantage of and point out the obvious correspondence between the
semi-parametric estimation techniques and existing discrete choice
models. This correspondence should provide the basis for future
research on the estimation of hazard models.
Taken together, the three chapters of this thesis address a
broad range of issues relating to the specific application of
duration models to the study of retirement and unemployment, and the
general use of these models in explaining a variety of economic
issues. The framework of analysis used in this thesis should
profitably extend to a number of important areas of current concern.
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Chapter 1
Social Security and the Determinants of Full
and Partial Retirement: A Competing
Risks Analysis
Intrxlduction
The Social Security system affects individual intertemporal
budget constraints through a complicated combination of taxes and
transfers. Despite the complexity of the task, several researchers
have been able to document the most important of these effects,
tracing the impact of a variety of Social Security rules upon the
budget constraint of a given individual. However, the labor supply
effects of changes in these constraints are less well understood.
Despite a number of attempts at quantification, important unanswered
questions remain regarding the relationship between the Social
Security system and retirement behavior. In this chapter I consider
a particular variant of this theme--the interrelated questions of
what factors influence the decision to retire and the form that the
retirement will take.
This chapter extends the previous analysis on the retirement
question in several ways. First, I estimate a model of retirement in
1See Blinder, Gordon and Wise [1980] and Aaron (1984] for relatively
comprehensive discussions of the issues involved.
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which partial retirement is treated distinctly from full retirement.
To date, most studies that have considered the retirement question
have relied on a single measure of retirement.2 The use of a single
measure has the effect of confounding the different motivations lying
behind the two decisions and leads to misleading inferences about the
effects of variables upon retirement decisions. The estimation of a
model which differentiates between full and partial retirement also
allows one readily to consider the effects of policy changes upon the
relative frequencies of the two forms of retirement.
This is also, to the best of my knowledge, the first analysis of
retirement behavior that uses a competing risks framework to analyze
full and partial retirement. In this chapter I use new econometric
techniques developed by Han and Hausman [1986] for the study of
duration data which allow for relatively few functional form
restrictions and the potential for correlation between retirement
risks.
The use of competing risks has several advantages for the study
of retirement behavior. For one, the use of duration models is
natural given the dynamic nature of the retirement decision. These
models allow results to be expressed in terms of changes over time in
the probabilities of retirement. Second, duration models allow the
2Notable exceptions include Boskin [1977], Gustman and Steinmeier
[1984 and 1986] and Zabalza et.al. [1980]. In addition, Burtless and
Moffitt [1984] consider post-retirement work behavior.
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treatment of changing predetermined variables which most static
models must assume away.3 Finally, the notion of a hazard rate, or
conditional probability of retirement, accords with the way in which
most individuals think about retirement in that they condition their
retirement decisions anew each period given the information they have
at that time.
Using these econometric techniques, I find that partial
retirement behavior differs substantively from full retirement
behavior. The dissimilarity of the two forms of retirement is
reflected in the differing effects of Social Security upon the
probabilities of retirement. In particular, I find that partial
retirement is more strongly influenced by economic variables than is
the corresponding full retirement decision. Furthermore, it appears
that full retirement may be strongly motivated by factors such as
health and occupation that are outside the realm of traditional
economic incentives.
In these results, Social Security has significant effects upon
retirement through both benefit levels and potential increases in
benefits. The finding that changes in the Social Security system
affect the two forms of retirement in different ways should be of
3In this chapter I do not consider the effects of time-varying
covariates upon the retirement process. The theoretical results of
chapter 3 of this thesis extend the semi-parametric techniques of Han
and Hausman to allow for changes over time in the predetermined
variables. I plan to implement this estimator in subsequent work.
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interest to policymakers. Simulation results indicate that the early
1970s growth in the Social Security system has increased the
probability of full retirement and reduced the probability of partial
retirement. The changes in probabilities account for a portion of
the observed decline in labor force participation, but probably
cannot be viewed as the primary factor.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section
1 provides an overview of the basic questions regarding the nature
and causes of retirement. I also discuss the institutional features
of the Social Security system that play a role in the retirement
decision and highlight the importance of partial retirement as a
means of exit from full-time employment. In section 2, I review
briefly the existing empirical literature. The econometric
specification is outlined in section 3, and the data are described in
section 4. The empirical results from the estimation of duration
models of retirement are presented in section 5. In addition to
parameter estimates, I discuss the results of simulations designed to
analyze the effects of recent changes in Social Security law upon
retirement behavior. There is a concluding section.
1. Background
1.1 Social Security
Many individuals have expressed a general concern with the
- 14 -
possible work-disincentive effects of Social Security, citing a
correlation between trends in elderly labor force participation rates
and Social Security benefit and wealth levels. In table 1,
legislated benefit increases are traced over the two decades of rapid
growth from 1960-1980. The growth in benefits was particularly rapid
in the early 1970s, with real primary insurance benefits increasing
by a minimum of 19.4 percent. Table 2 presents corresponding
statistics showing the decline in labor force participation rates for
both males and females over roughly the same period. Again, there
are relatively large changes in the early 1970s. Between 1970 and
1975, the participation rate for males aged 55-64 fell from 83.0 to
75.8, a decrease almost 5 times larger than that experienced over the
preceeding 5 years. These figures on benefit levels and labor force
participation have generated considerable empirical interest in the
question of how much of the decline in participation rates can be
attributed to the growth of Social Security.
There is some theoretical justification for concern over the
relationship between Social Security and early retirement. For
individuals between the ages of 62 and 72 considering whether to
continue working or to retire, the Social Security system creates
significant non-linearities in the return to work. In essence,
4The change in the rates for females between 1970 and 1975 shows a
similar increase relative to the preceeding 5-year period, though the
magnitudes and directions of the changes over the 20-year period are
clearly influenced by a variety of other social factors.
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Table 1 - Cumulative effect of statutory and automatic increases in
real primary insurance benefits: minimum percentages, 1959-80 --
select dates.
Date of Comparison
Base Date
Jan 1959
Jan 1965
Jan 1970
June 1975
Jan
1965
-1.2
Jan
1970
9.2
6.9
June
1975
35.3
11.4
19.4
June
1980
48.3
48.8
26.8
-2.1
Source: Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical
Supplement (1981), p. 27.
Table 2 - Labor force participation rates
and sex: 1960-1980
Male
55-64
65 +
1960
86.8
33.1
Female
55-64 37.2
10.865 +
Source: Bureau of the Census.
States 1981, p. 381.
1965
84.6
27.9
41.1
10.0
for the elderly, by age
1970
83.0
26.8
43.0
9.7
1975
75.8
21.7
41.0
8.3
1980
72.3
19.1
41.5
8.1
Statistical Abstract of the United
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beginning at age 62, the basic benefit level is taxed at a 50% rate
for earnings over a specified level until the benefits are
exhausted.5 The tax schedule yields the familiar non-linear budget
constraint depicted in figure 1. Prior to age 62, an individual
faces the budget set ABC which is governed by the after tax wage
w(1-t). At age 62, the individual is eligible to receive a basic
benefit level of B if he retires. Up to an earnings level of X., the
marginal incentives are unchanged so that the slope of the budget
line is given by the negative of the earlier after-tax wage. At that
point, the earnings test taxes the basic benefit at a 1:2 rate so
that the slope of the budget line is now w(1-t-0.5). At X1 , the
basic benefits are exhausted and the individual's budget set lies
along the BC portion of the original segment. The total budget set
under the Social Security system is thus DEBC.
Several analysts have seized upon the implications of figure 1
as a reason for concern with the work-incentive effects of the Social
Security system. The unambiguous conclusion that Social Security
reduces labor force participation does not, however, follow
immediately. Drawing inferences based upon figure 1 alone can be
misleading since the diagram does not fully capture the relevant
incentives. In particular it ignores the life-cycle nature of the
choices involved as well as salient features of the Social Security
5In 1981, the earnings test allowed a maximum of $6,600 in earnings
before benefits were reduced.
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Figure 1 - Non-Linear Budget Constraint For Individual
Eligible for Social Security Benefits
Income
C
'N
N
'K8  E
K
KK~I N
I K
'N
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I C
X x
-w (l-t-0.5)
D
-w (1-t)
A
0
I0
Hours
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system.
First, the existence of automatic benefit recomputation (ABR)
implies that the return to work consists of increments to Social
Security wealth in addition to earnings. The effects of ABR have
been outlined in some depth by Blinder, Gordon and Wise (BGW) [1980].
In brief, the Social Security benefits that are received by an
individual upon retirement are calculated on the basis of the
lifetime work history. The first step involves calculating a measure
of the individual's average monthly wages (ANW) which, to simplify
somewhat, are computed by averaging over the T highest years of
earnings in covered employment.6 The primary insurance amount (PIA)
is obtained by applying the AMW to a progressive benefit formula. An
unmarried individual retiring at the base age of 65 receives the PIA;
a married couple receives either the sum of the individual
entitlements, or 1.5 times the single benefit level, whichever is
greater. An individual who works for an additional year is able to
6The value of T depends upon the age of the individual and the year
in which the computation takes place. For the individuals in the
RHS, the relevant formula is
T = min(year,yr65) - 1956
where year = the year of the computation and yr65 = the year the
individual turns 65. For currently retiring individuals, the number
of years of computation is the minimum of the current age less 26,
and 36.
7Beginning in 1974, benefits were indexed for inflation. The PIA is
multiplied by the ratio of the growth in the CPI over the interval
from 1974 to the year benefits are received. As Diamond (1977]
notes, this creates significant overindexation for inflation since
- 19 -
substitute current earnings for the minimum of the earnings currently
used in the computation of the AMW. Individuals with upward sloping
age-earnings profiles are likely to have much higher current earnings
than those received in the lowest earnings period, especially in an
inflationary environment, so that the increases in the AMW and hence
in future Social Security benefits can be significant. BGW perform
calculations which suggest that under pre-1977 law, the wealth effect
is on the order of a 50% wage subsidy for a representative
individual.
Second, the effects of the imperfect actuarial adjustment mean
that the relevant lifetime budget constraint can be improved by
additional work up through age 65. Actuarial adjustments are made to
the basic benefit with the stated purpose of providing statistically
fair increases and decreases in benefits for those accelerating or
postponing retirement. Individuals who elect to retire prior to age
65 have their monthly benefits decreased to account for the longer
expected period of time over which they will be receiving those
benefits. The actuarial reduction is 5/9% for each month between
ages 62 and 65 in which the individual does not draw benefits. No
benefits are paid prior to age 62. Similarly, benefits are increased
the indexation is from a fixed date rather than from the date the
individual turns 62, and since, prior to 1977, the AMW computations
were based upon nominal income. From 1977 onward, the AMW is
computed using earnings indexed by the growth in overall earnings
levels.
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by 1/12% for each month without payment of benefits between ages 65
and 72.8 Calculations made by BGW indicate that these actuarial
adjustments are fair or more than fair for the 62-65 period and less
than fair for the post-65 period. Thus, there is an actuarial bonus
to delaying retirement to age 65, but a penalty for delaying past 65.
The effects of ABR and actuarial adjustments are difficult to
capture with a single-period model of this type, but if thought of as
wage subsidies, can be represented by increases in the slope of the
budget line under Social Security. For large enough wage subsidies,
the income and substitution effects operate in opposite directions,
with the substitution effect encouraging work. The result of the
various income and substitution effects are such that the exact
relationship between Social Security and retirement is theoretically
ambiguous. Furthermore, assessing the magnitude of the effects of
Social Security upon retirement requires empirical analysis.
1.2 Partial Retirement
1.2.1 The Definition of Retirement
There is no natural way in which to define retirement,
consequently a variety of definitions for retirement have been used
in the empirical literature. Among them are complete withdrawl from
the labor force (Gordon and Blinder (1980]), transition from job held
8Recent legislation has allowed the full payment of benefits once an
individual reaches age 70, regardless of employment status.
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at the start of the sample (Fields and Mitchell [1984]),
self-reported status (Hausman and Wise [1985]), the receipt of
pension income (Burkhauser (1979]), and work less than a specified
number of hours (Boskin [1977]).
Difficulties arise with the use of each of these definitions.
Under the definition based upon labor force participation,
individuals working a few hours a week but who are substantively
retired and perhaps drawing pension benefits will be classified as
working. Under a transition definition, individuals who make job
changes totally unrelated to retirement will be classified as
retired. Self-reported status suffers from being unrelated to
observable economic activity. Available evidence suggests that using
pension receipt as an indicator of retirement may be misleading
because many individuals who are not working at all receive no
pension income (Diamond and Hausman [1984]). Finally, there is a
certain arbitrariness to definitions based upon reduced work effort.
What is most disturbing is the result that these definitions often
yield conflicting classifications. 9
Underlying these definitional difficulties is the fact that a
single form of retirement is unable to capture the behavior of
individuals who are not employed in a "standard" full-time job, but
9To see the problems involved, consider the case of an individual who
reduces the number of hours worked per week in the same job by a
third in order to collect a newly vested partial pension.
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are still in the labor force. It is this fundamental problem that
motivates the consideration of partial retirement in this paper.
Like full retirement, partial retirement can be defined in a
number of ways, but central to the concept is a discontinuous, though
not complete, reduction in work effort. An individual who wishes to
reduce his work effort can do so by reducing the number of hours
worked per week, by reducing the number of weeks worked per year, by
working less diligently during the time spent at work, or through
some combination of the above. For the purposes of this study,
partial retirement is defined as employment at a job in which the
individual reports less than 35 hours of work per week or employment
for less than 46 weeks (the weeks-equivalent of a 35 hour work
week).10 The definition corresponds to considering reductions in the
hours and weeks worked, but ignores the unobservable measure of work
effort.1 1
In the subsequent discussion, retirement of either form will be
10Weeks of unemployment are considered as weeks of employment when
evaluating the latter measure. It is possible that individuals will
report vacation time as weeks of no work so that the weeks definition
will overstate the extent of partial retirement. This does not
appear to be a problem since almost all individuals who are
classified as partially retired under the weeks definition are also
partially retired by an hours criterion.
11This definition suffers from the arbitrariness cited above. Among
the studies that have considered partial retirement, Boskin [1977]
and Zabalza et. al. [1980] use reduced hours of work; Gustman and
Steinmeier (1986] use self-reported status. The particular choice of
definition used in this study is motivated in part by the questioning
patterns of the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, and in part
by a desire to base the definition on observed behavior.
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referred to simply as retirement; where distinguishing between full
and partial retirement is necessary, the appropriate qualifier will
be used.
1.2.2 The Extent of Partial Retirement
Typically, analyses of retirement behavior have not considered
the possibility of partial retirement and have defined a single form
of retirement in one of the ways listed above. The notion that
partial retirement is distinct from full retirement and should be
treated separately in empirical work was first adopted by Boskin
[1977] and has been used by, among others, Boskin and Hurd [1978] and
Zabalza et. al. (1980]. For the most part, however, researchers have
utilized the concept of a single form of retirement.12
Recent work by Gustman and Steinmeier [1984] has shed some light
on the extent of partial retirement. Using a sample drawn from the
Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (RHS), they find that of those
individuals who are observed to transit from full-time employment,
approximately 28.2% partially retire. Over one-third of the
individuals studied report partial retirement in at least one of the
four sample periods. These results are corroborated by Zabalza et.
al. who report that their sample of elderly in Great Britain exhibits
a well-defined bimodal distribution of hours worked, and by Parnes
1 2Relatively comprehensive surveys of the literature are provided by
Fields and Mitchell [1984] and Aaron [1984).
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and Nestel [1981] who find that about 20% of their 1966-1975 National
Longitudinal Survey sample reports post-retirement labor market
activity.13 Noreover, given current and anticipated future
reductions in mortality rates and the resulting increases in
longevity, the importance of partial retirees in the economy is
likely to grow over time.
Drawing upon data derived from the RHS, I find results that are
similar to those of Gustman and Steinmeier, despite the use of an
hours/weeks worked definition rather than self-reported status.
Table 3 shows the number of individuals retiring at various ages,
aggregated across cohorts, broken down by type of retirement. The
censoring category refers to those individuals who do not retire over
the sample interval. The age at censoring is therefore the last age
at which they were observed. The sample includes only those
individuals who retire after age 57. Since less than 1/2 of one
percent of the individuals report retirement prior to age 58, and of
those individuals, one-quarter appear to be subject to coding error,
or are highly unrepresentative of the population as a whole, this
13In the latter study, retirement is defined by self-reported status.
Among those classified as retired who reported having worked in the
12 month period prior to the 1976 survey, approximately 17 percent
reported working more than 2,000 hours. Assuming work over the
entire year, this translates into about 38.5 hours per week. 23
percent of the sample reported working more than 29 hours per week,
42 percent more than 19 hours per weekk,and 71 more than 10 hours per
week.
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Table 3 - Age distribution of retirement or censoring by type of
first retirement, 1633 person RHS subsample.
Type of Initial Retirement
Age at Retirement (Number of Persons)
Full Partial Censored Total
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
Totals
4
6
13
27
86
124
117
275
173
67
36
19
14
5
7
2
975
1
0
11
14
61
56
130
75
65
52
20
16
5
6
1
2
515
0
0
7
6
7
7
4
8
1
1
29
23
16
14
12
8
143
5
6
24
41
147
180
247
350
238
119
56
35
19
11
8
4
1633
Note: Based upon author's calculations. The various forms of
retirement are defined in the text.
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procedure should not create undue biases. 1 Focusing first on the
number of individuals in each retirement class, table 3 shows that
out of a sample of 1633 individuals, over 500 partially retire.
Since 975 individuals move directly to full retirement, a little
under a third of those who actually retire over the sample period
partially retire. While a bit higher than the figure found by
Gustman and Steinmeier, the observed fraction is certainly comparable
in magnitude.
In table 4 I present data on mean age of retirement for various
types of retirement. To see the impact of differing definitions,
note that if one defines retirement to be the first instance of full
or partial retirement, the mean retirement age is 64.75; this average
age is in contrast to a mean retirement age of 66.19 resulting from a
definition based upon complete withdrawl from the labor force.
Breaking down the mean age of initial retirement, the mean age for
partial retirees is 64.68, slightly less than the corresponding age
of 64.79 for full retirees.
The closeness of these mean values hides a considerable amount
of work activity. For those individuals who partially retire and are
14The ages of retirement for these individuals include 36, 46 and 48.
The calculations of the percentage who are excluded on the basis of
retirement age are based upon preliminary work utilizing a slightly
different subsample than the one used in the estimation. While it
can be argued that this exclusion creates a form of self-selection
which biases the results, it seems more likely that these individuals
differ from the rest of the population in the way that retirement
decisions are made and should therefore be considered separately.
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Table 4 - Mean age of retirement
RHS subsample.
under different retirement paths,
mean
Mean Age of Initial Retirement
By Type of Retirement
Full
Partial
Mean Age of Final Retirement
By Type of Initial Retirement
Full
Partial
Mean Duration of Partial
Retirement
64.752
64.791
64.678
66.186
64.791
69.841
5.500
Std. Dev.
2.201
2.169
2.260
3.151
2.169
2.269
2.037
N
1490
975
515
1347
975
372
372
Note: Based upon author's calculations. All samples are limited to
completed spells for the retirement in question. The partial
retirement category for mean age of final retirement refers to those
individuals observed to fully retire who first partially retired.
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subsequently observed to fully retire, the mean duration of partial
retirement is approximately 5.5 years. As one might expect, the
duration is negatively correlated (-0.446) with the age of initial
retirement so that individuals who retire earlier remain in partial
retirement for a longer period of time. The mean duration is in
excess of the durations studied by Gustman and Steinmeier who find
that most of those who partially retire spend a relatively short
period of time, one to two years, in that state. The discrepancy
results, no doubt, not only from the differences in the definitions
of partial retirement, but also from the differing definitions of
full retirement since I use a definition based upon complete
withdrawl from the labor force while Gustman and Steinmeier use
self-reported full retirement. The latter definition will classify
as fully retired individuals listed as partially retired by my
definition.
In addition to differences between mean retirement ages, there
are differences in the distribution of retirement ages. Table 3
shows that the number of individuals classified as retiring at a
given age rises slowly up to age 62, then sharply through age 65,
declining in subsequent years. The same is true when considering
either full or partial retirees alone, though the number of partial
retirees is generally smaller than the corresponding number of full
retirees. The modal age for those who partially retire is age 64,
earlier than for those who first fully retire, a result that is
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reflected in the slightly lover mean age of retirement. Somewhat
surprisingly, the total number of partial retirees at age 64 is
greater than the corresponding number of full retirees. The
relationship is reversed at virtually every other age.
More informative, perhaps, are simple calculations of the hazard
rates for both types of retirement. These represent the probability
of retiring at a given age conditional on not having retired prior to
that age. Thus, the full retirement hazard for a 63 year old
individual is the probability that he fully retires at age 63, given
that he has not retired previously. The hazards are calculated by
dividing the number of retirees of a given type, (full or partial) at
a given age, by the number of unretired individuals up to that age.15
Hazard rates for both forms of retirement are depicted in figure
2. Up to age 64, the hazards are similar in shape, with the full
retirement hazard rising somewhat faster than the partial retirement
hazard. There is a pronounced spike in the full retirement hazard at
age 65 that is not present for partial retirement. If anything, the
partial retirement hazard is bimodal, with a pronounced drop in the
hazard at age 65 and peaks at age 64 and 66. Moreover, with the
exception of ages 65-66, the partial retirement hazard lies above the
full retirement hazard for most ages greater than 64. The difference
15It is easy to show that this is the maximum likelihood estimator of
the hazard rate for a homogeneous sample. This estimator is referred
to in the statistics literature as the Kaplan-Meier estimator.
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Figure 2 - Sample Hazard Rates for Retirement
Full and Partial Retirement
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in hazards suggests that individuals who fully retire are retiring at
the "standard" ages close to 65 and that, conditional upon not
retiring at those ages, an individual is more likely to move into
partial retirement prior to full retirement than directly to full
retirement.
The most important conclusion that I draw from the comparison of
sample hazard rates is that the age-profiles suggest that different
factors are leading to the decisions to retire fully or partially.
Estimation of a model which does not distinguish between the two will
confound the differences in behavior implied by the different
hazards. Two cautions should be expressed at this point. First,
underlying the results depicted in figure 2 is the assumption that
the population is homogeneous. This assumption is obviously
untenable and the econometric specifications developed in the paper
are designed to relax this restriction. Second, the sample sizes
become relatively small as one moves out to the right tail of the age
distribution so that some caution should be taken in drawing
conclusions based upon the shape of the hazards at these later ages.
Still, the hazards differ by enough so that it should be safe to
conclude that distinguishing between full and partial retirement is
important.
2. The Existing Literature
Early empirical work on retirement behavior was conducted by
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Boskin [1977] who analyzed the labor force participation of a 131
observation sample of households, finding very large negative effects
for Social Security. Based upon estimates from a first-order Markov
model of transition probabilities, he concluded that the existence of
the Social Security system has increased the annual probability of
retirement by 40 percent. The 40 percent figure suggests that Social
Security is responsible for the bulk of the observed decline in labor
force participation in the past few decades.
This view was challenged by Gordon and Blinder [1980] who,
building upon their work with Wise [1980] on the institutional
characteristics of Social Security, postulate a three-period life-
cycle model of labor-leisure choice in which individuals presently
choose to work or to retire as the market wage is greater than or
less than a reservation wage. Based upon estimates from this model
GS find that Social Security has rather small effects on retirement
behavior--a change in the Social Security wealth to income ratio of
0.01 (about 14 percent) has a negligable impact upon retirement
probabilities. 16
Later work by, among others, Fields and Mitchell [1984], Boskin
and Hurd (1984], Burkhauser (1979], Zabalza et. al. (1981] and
16The Gordon and Blinder finding that Social Security has almost no
effect upon retirement stands virtually alone in the empirical
literature, and is difficult to reconcile with the large spikes in
retirement hazards coincident with Social Security eligibility found
by Hausman and Wise [1985] and others.
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Burtless [1986], using a variety of techniques come to a number of
often conflicting conclusions. This smorgasbord of results led Aaron
to conclude in 1984 that "...about all that can be said is that a
preponderance of studies, whose evidentiary value is quite low,
concludes that Social Security has an indeterminate impact upon
retirement behavior."
Among the many studies which consider the determinants of
retirement behavior, perhaps the closest to the present analysis are
the recent study of partial retirement conducted by Gustman and
Steinmeier [1986] and the risk models of retirement developed by
Hausman and Wise (1985] and Diamond and Hausman [1984]. In this
paper, I combine the concern with partial retirement of Gustman and
Steinmeier with the statistical techniques developed in the Hausman
and Wise and Diamond and Hausman papers, while relaxing some of the
less satisfactory assumptions in both.
Gustman and Steinmeier (GS) estimate a structural model of
retirement in which partial retirement is represented by the presence
of an alternative wage-leisure offer. Demographic and other control
variables enter into the specification solely through the preference
for leisure, while economic variables enter through the lifetime
budget constraint. They find moderate effects of economic variables
upon retirement, with a hypothetical 50 percent increase in
compensation streams for full and partial retirement, pensions, and
Social Security reducing the percentage of individuals working
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full-time by about 10 percentage points for individuals up through
age 64, and by a smaller amount for older individuals. This increase
in the number of retirees is distributed unevenly across the two
types of retirement.
While the GS paper is a careful analysis of the partial
retirement issue and as such is an important contribution to the
analysis of retirement behavior, the overly simple structure of their
model makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of Social
Security from the effects of, say earnings. 7 In fact, it is a
requirement of the GS model that the effects of a dollar increase in
the present discounted value (PDV) of Social Security benefits
exactly equal a corresponding increase the PDV of earnings or wealth.
If it is believed that individuals discount future Social Security
benefits at a different rate than other income streams, this
assumption is untenable. The assumption of identical discount rates
is likely to be a problem given evidence of liquidity constraints,
since individuals are prohibited by law from borrowing against Social
Security wealth.18 Furthermore, the GS assumption that individuals
face a single alternative wage-leisure offer for partial retirement
17In all fairness, this is the result of the extreme complexity of
their estimation technique.
18See Paquette [1985] for evidence that elderly individuals face
constraints on their liquidity. Diamond and Hausman [1984] also
provide evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Males
that supports this result.
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is open to criticism.
The HW and DH studies both take a different approach to
analyzing the determinants of retirement. Building upon the
statistical literature and the work of Lancaster [1979] they specify
functional forms for the conditional probability of retirement and
use these to estimate probabilities of retirement at different ages.
Using a sample drawn from the RHS, HW estimate a hazard model of
retirement which indicates that Social Security and other economic
variables have significant effects upon retirement. According to
their calculations, the increase in Social Security benefits over the
past two decades may account for up to one-third of the decrease in
labor force participation. DH estimate a hazard model of retirement
for a slightly younger sample of National Longitudinal Survey of
Older Men (NLS) individuals. Their results are similar in character
to the HW results.
Unfortunately, these latter two studies assume a single form of
retirement. Moreover, in the specification of the hazard functions,
strong parametric restrictions are placed upon the behavior of
individuals. These restrictions take the form of simple functional
form specifications for the effects of aging upon retirement
probabilities.19 In this paper I relax both the assumption of a
19The same is true for the dual-risk model estimated by DH for
re-employment and retirement of the unemployed. The DH restrictions
involve linearity of the latent random variables for time to
re-employment and time to retirement with respect to the covariates.
This specification implicitly places strong, non-testable functional
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single form of retirement and the parametric restrictions upon
behavior.
3. Econometric Specification
The econometric techniques employed in this paper are derived
from the extensive literature on hazard models.20 Hazard models have
enjoyed considerable popularity in empirical work since Lancaster
[1979] introduced them to the economics profession in his study of
unemployment durations. The previously mentioned studies by HW and
DH apply these techniques to the study of retirement behavior. This
paper, in contrast to earlier studies, uses techniques developed
recently by Han and Hausman [1986) to estimate semi-parametric dual
risk models that allow for correlation between the risks. In the
retirement context, the two risks of interest are the probabilities
of full and partial retirement. The technique is outlined in some
detail in the remainder of the section.
It should first be noted, however, that despite an obvious
relationship to other discrete choice models such as the logit, these
techniques employ reduced forms which are not grounded in maximizing
theory. While one can think of an individual solving a complicated
form restrictions upon the shapes of the baseline hazards.
20These models are also referred to as failure time models. Standard
references in the statistical literature are Cox and Oakes [1984] and
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980].
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dynamic stochastic programming problem to determine an optimal
retirement date, such a model cannot be linked directly to these
hazard estimates. Intuitively, however, the model that underlies
these specifications is one in which individuals solve a maximizing
problem by making sequential labor-force participation decisions,
comparing the utility received from retiring at a given time with the
utility from continuing to work as well as the utility received from
accepting an alternative, partial retirement wage-leisure offer and
retiring at a later date.21 The utility comparisons are influenced
both by the age at which the decisions are being made and by the
effects of other, individual specific factors.
3.1 Single Risk Estimation
Generally, an observation on a failure time can be of two types.
First, the time of failure can be the direct result of the hazard
process under investigation. Thus, a direct failure time observation
on retirement would provide the age at which an individual is
observed to retire. Alternatively, the time of failure can result
from right censoring of the data. Right censoring occurs when the
period over which the individual is surveyed is not long enough for
21These offers might be thought of as coming from a distribution of
offers in much the same way that job offers are received by an
unemployed individual (see Katz [1985]). Much more thought needs to
be applied to the question of the best way in which to combine the
retirement and reservation wage frameworks.
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observation of a direct failure time. For example, the ending of the
RHS sample period in 1979 censors failure times for those individuals
who are still working at that date.
A failure time observation can therefore be characterized by the
time of failure and by the type of failure, actual or censored.
Suppose that failure time data of the form (t.,5.,X ), i=1,...,N, are
observed where
t. is the observed failure time for individual I
a is a censoring indicator where a= 0 ohercnsored failure
X is a k-vector of covariates.
In the retirement context, t represents the age of retirement if 8=0,
or the age that the individual leaves the survey if 8=1. It should
be pointed out that in most of the discussion that follows, t. is an
assumed to be a discrete approximation to the true failure time. The
use of a discrete approximation results from the fact that in most
data available to economists, observations on individuals are made at
discrete points in time. For the RHS survey, the discreteness of the
data results from the fact that observations on individual employment
status may only be made at year intervals. Thus, an observed failure
time of t. implies that the true failure time lies in the interval
(t -1,t ].
Let the continuous non-negative random variable T represent the
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true failure time. Suppressing the individual subscript, I assume
that the conditional probability of retirement at time t can be
written in the following form
(3.1.1) h(t) = lim+ Pr(t < T ( t + 4 I T > t)4-. 4
= A(t) exp(Xp).
where A(t) is a non-negative function of age which represents the
effect of time upon the conditional probability. This model is the
proportional hazards specification of Cox [1972). It derives its
name from the fact the effects of the covariates X operate
proportionally upon the baseline hazard A(t) through the parameters
A-
Two functions of h(t) are of additional interest. First, the
survivor function, Q(t), gives the probability that the individual
failure time is greater than t so that the individual is observed not
to have failed at time t. In the present analysis, survival
corresponds to noting that an individual has not yet retired at a
given age. Second, the unconditional density function for failure
time, f(t), is a standard probability density function for the random
variable for failure time, T. Both can readily be written in terms
of h(t):
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(3.1.2) Q(t) = Pr(T > t) = exp(- f h(s) ds),
(3.1.3) f(t) = lim+ Pr(t < T < t + J) = h(t) Q(t).
The complete specification of the likelihood of an observation for
either continuous or discrete data is possible using a combination of
(3.1.2) and (3.1.3).
Unobservable individual effects are readily incorporated into
the specification. Suppose that there is an additional random
component to the hazard function, 0, which enters multiplicatively.
Then (3.1.1) becomes
(3.1.4) h(tje) = e A(t) exp(Xp) = 9 h(t).
where e is a non-negative random variable assumed to be independent
of the covariates. Following the technique of Lancaster [1979],
assuming that 9 is distributed as a unit-mean gamma random variable
and taking expectations with respect to e allows for the derivation
of closed-form expressions for the survivor function
(3.1.5) Q (t) E E9 Q(t je)
= E9 exp(- f h(s|e) ds)
S (1+a f h(s) ds)_ 2
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where o2 is the variance of the gamma distribution.
It is a straightforward exercise to write out, for the entire
sample, the log-likelihood functions associated with each of these
specifications. For illustrative purposes, I consider two cases.
First, if there is continuous data and no heterogeneity, the
log-likelihood function is given by
N
(3.1.6) log L(p) = 1 (1-8 ) log h(t ) + 5 log Q(t.)
i=1 11 11
while if heterogeneity is present and there is discrete data of the
form described above, the log-likelihood is
N
(3.1.7) log L(p,o) = Z (1-6 ) log (Q (t -1) - Q (t ))
i=1 111
*
+ 6. log Q (t )
Most commonly, the specification has been completed by choosing a
functional parameterization of the baseline hazard A(t)--often a
single-parameter Weibull (A(t) = a t "~). Unfortunately, it has been
established that results obtained from maximum likelihood estimation
of these functions are sensitive to the choice of a distribution for
the heterogeneity parameter and the choice of functional form for the
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baseline hazard.22 To reduce the biases resulting from functional
form restrictions, I adopt the semi-parametric HH approach of
estimating (3.1.6) and (3.1.7) parametrically with respect to the p,
but with no restrictions on the form of A(t).
To see how the technique works, note that (3.1.3) can be
rewritten as the transformed model
(3.1.8) It = X +
t(3.1.9) 1t log ft A(s) ds
where e has an extreme value distribution. Rewriting the likelihood
in the regression form involves a simple transformation of variables,
a process which is outlined in greater detail in Appendix 1.
Suppose now that an individual is observed to have retired at
time t where t is again a discrete approximation to the actual
failure time T. The probability of observing a failure at time t for
a given individual is given by
(3.1.10) Pr(t-1 < T t) = +x f() de
fit-1+XA
The estimation technique involves treating the 1 t-functions of the
22See Heckman and Singer [1985] and Manton, et. al. [1986].
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baseline hazard as a parameter for each of the T potential failure
periods and estimating them jointly with the p. Letting yit = 1 if a
failure is observed for individual i at time period t and 0
otherwise, the log-likelihood for the entire sample corresponding to
(3.1.6) can be written as
(3.1.11) log L(P,1)
N T
= Z yi (6i log fe) de
i=1 t=1 rt+xp
+ (1-68) log t +XP (e) de
where (1 = 1 1 ,**. 1). Since s has an extreme value distribution,
the specification corresponds to an ordered logit likelihood, with
the categories determined by the T failure times.23 The addition of
heterogeneity to the model is straightforward, and is presented in
Appendix 2.
3.2 Competing Risks Estimation
The extension of the semi-parametric technique to the competing
2 3As might be expected, assuming that the e has a standard normal
distribution yields essentially the same parameter estimates (after
scaling for the unequal variances) except in the extreme tails of the
distributions. Both models are easy to compute since algorithms for
computing the CDFs are well-known. This finding is analagous to the
results for the logit and probit models.
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risk model is natural. Suppose that the model is cast in terms of
latent variables. Let k = 1,...,K represent the K competing risks in
the model. Let the non-negative random variables Y represent the
possibly latent failure times for each of the K risks. These random
variables are analagous to the random variable T defined above for
the single risk case. Then let the observed failure time T be the
minimum of the underlying durations so that
(**)
(3.2.1) T =min(Y ,...,yK
represents the observed failure time. Thus, in a manner parallel to
the single risk case, cause-specific hazard rates can be specified
lim Pr(t Y ( t + 4 1 Y > t, j=1,...,K)(3.2.2) h4k = 40 +
= Ak(t) exp(Xkpk)'
k = 1,...,K . In the presence of all K risks and no ties, the
overall hazard, survivor and density functions are given by
K
(3.2.3) h(t) = Z h k(t),
k=1
(3.2.4) Q(t) = exp(- f 0 h(s) ds)
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(3.2.5) fk(t) = hk(t) Q(t)
k=1,...,K.
Once again, these functions can be expressed in their regression
forms. For simplicity, consider the case of two risks. Adopting the
notation used for the single risk specification, the model can be
written as
(3.2.6) 1t +
2
1t =-2A + 62'
If e and e2 are assumed to be independent, the likelihood function
for each risk can be estimated as a single risk model in which the
alternative failures are treated as censored observations.24 If, for
example, the errors are assumed to be independent Weibull, then the
techniques described in the previous section are directly applicable.
If the errors are not independent, then the joint distribution
of (el,"2) is required. The probability of observing a failure of
24This technique is similar to the approach taken by Katz (1986] who
estimates models based upon the Lancaster-type likelihood, taking
account of factoring of the joing likelihood under the assumption of
independence. He estimates his model assuming the baseline hazard is
a modified Weibull.
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type 1 at t = min(t1 , t2 ) is the probability that t lies in the
interval (t-1,tJ and t2 is greater than t as the latter is evaluated
at every point in that interval. The probability is represented by
1 X
(3.2.7) H1 (t) , 002) d62 )de
1t-1+Xp A *
where g(e is the function relating the two errors so that t2 is
equal to t . An analagous expression results if the failure is of
type 2. Assuming linearity of the hazards over the interval, it can
be shown that
(12_ 2
(3.2.8) g(e = +x 2 2 ) + t t-1 (f - (1 + X p),
1 t+ X)02) + ( 1 1 )
t t-1
(Appendix 3).
If an observation is censored so that there is no failure of
either type, the corresponding likelihood is given by the joint
survivor function
(3.2.9) C(t) = f e' ) d e de-
- f 2 1- 1 2 2 10
Completion of the specification is accomplished by the choice of
Mee 2) to be bivariate normal with correlation coefficient p. The
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specification allows for dependence between the disturbances in the
model. Since the baseline hazards for the two risks are estimated
semi-parametrically, the strong functional form restrictions made by
DH and HW are avoided.25
The observed data are now of the form (t ,s (k), 8.), k=1,2,
where t and a are as defined before and s is an indicator variable
for the type of failure (s(k)=1 if failure of type k, s(k)=O
otherwise). The indicator variable yit is defined as in the single
risk case. The log-likelihood function can be written as
(3.2.10) log L(p,l,p)
N T 2
= z z yit (a log C(t) + Z s (k) log H k(t)).
i=1 t=1 k=1
The likelihood function is therefore maximized over the parameters
p,, A2, the semi-parametric baseline hazards (k k
k=1,2) and the correlation coefficient for the bivariate normal p.
All of the likelihoods in this paper were maximized using
standard maximum likelihood techniques. The algorithm used is a
modified version of the Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman [1974]
25The extension to several risks is straightforward. With present
computational techniques, estimation of models with up to three or
four risks should be possible. See Hausman and Wise [1978] for a
discussion of the computational issues relating to the evaluation of
multivariate normal distributions. See also McFadden (1986] for a
simulated moments approach to the estimation of models with many
risks.
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gradient technique that employs quadratic interpolation to determine
stepsizes. Convergence for all of the models was achieved with
little difficulty. The actual estimation technique involved
estimating the p and I with retirement ages past a given age treated
as censored failures. The estimated parameters were then used as
starting values for a model with all retirement ages unconstrained.
4. Data
The data used in this study are derived from the Longitudinal
Retirement History (RHS). The RHS is a panel data set comprised of
observations at two-year intervals on 11,000 elderly individuals,
aged 58-63 in 1969 over the period from 1969-1979. The sample used
in the estimation is restricted to male, non-farm workers in private,
but not self-employment, for whom there are sufficiently complete
data to allow for observation over at least one of the five RHS waves
(1971-1979) that are used in this study. The original extract that I
received was comprised of approximately 4,000 observations; after
considerable cleaning, the data set used in the estimation consists
of 1,633 individuals.
The first wave of the RHS (1969) was not used because of
problems with the comparability of data across the surveys. Of the
original 4,400 observations, 697 were lost because of an inability to
determine industrial and occupation classifications. 384 were lost
because of insufficient data to impute assets holdings for any of the
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five waves. There were 199 individuals who had highly irregular work
histories. An additional 1,474 individuals were lost because I am
unable to follow their employment status for at least one period or
because of poor data over the sample period. For example, for 138
individuals it was impossible to use existing earnings records or to
impute earnings records.
In principle, one could use the information that individual had
not retired prior to the date that the poor data were observed--this
would involve censoring the individual failure time at that date.
This would, however, have the effect of mixing the "failure times" of
the poor data with the hazard processes for full and partial
retirement. Noreover, given the computational complexity of the dual
risk likelihood and the resulting desire to keep sample sizes small,
I chose to leave that extension for future research. The following
results should be interpreted bearing this sample selection
proceedure in mind.
Since the nature of work effort is central to the analysis, it
is important to distinguish carefully between full and partial
retirement. As noted above, an hours/weeks based definition of the
extent of work is used. Individuals who are reported as fully or
partially retiring in a given sample year are traced back through the
previous sample period to see whether or not they have held an
intervening partial retirement job, with the type of retirement and
age at retirement adjusted accordingly. Ages at retirement are then
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incremented by one so that a reported retirement age of 65 indicates
that the individual retired in the interval (64,65]. The age
adjustment is merely a normalization and is for computational
convenience.
Two types of variables are used in the estimation procedure:
heterogeneity controls and economic variables. The control variables
include health status, number of persons in household, marital
status, race, education, the presence of mandatory retirement
provisions on the job, and occupation class. The economic variables
are related to the income and compensation streams that individuals
receive and include earnings, wealth, pension eligibility and Social
Security.
Most of the control variables are self-explanatory. Health
status is an indicator for poor health based upon self-reported
status. The responses are based upon the answer to the question, "Is
your health worse than others your age?" It has long been thought
that health status is one of the primary determinants of retirement
age. The effect of changes in health status will be to change
preferences for leisure and perhaps to create an exogenous change in
the wage rate. Poor health should therefore have a positive impact
upon retirement probabilities. Additionally, it might be expected
that health status will have a different effect upon the
probabilities of full and partial retirement since individuals with
poor health should be more likely to retire fully than partially
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retire given that the distribution of partial retirement wage-leisure
offers should be poorer for an individual with bad health. In
contrast, the characteristics of the full retirement choice are
unchanged.
It should be noted that a number of researchers have questioned
the exogeneity of self-reported health measures, arguing that
individuals will report poor health to avoid the stigma associated
with early retirement. The issue of health status endogeneity is
raised by Parnes [1981] and discussed at greater length by Feldman
[1984). The latter concludes that the reporting error is likely to
be of little practical importance. Furthermore, DH find that the use
of different indicators of health status does not alter their results
appreciably.
The economic variables follow closely the variables used in
existing studies. Earnings are included as a measure of the
opportunity cost of retiring. For individuals with adequate
information, actual earnings are used, otherwise earnings are imputed
on the basis of the Social Security earnings records that have been
adjusted by the Fox [1981] imputation method to account for
truncation. These values are net of payroll taxes but not of income
taxes because of serious difficulties with measuring non-labor
26
income. 26Theory suggests that earnings will reduce the probability
26This use of gross earnings levels is not unique despite the
conflict with theory. The addition of properly computed income taxes
is difficult given the complexity of the RHS, but is nevertheless a
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of retiring since high earnings represent a high cost of retiring.
The assets data are based upon estimates of the non-housing wealth
held by individuals. Since the RHS data is somewhat spotty, where it
is necessary these values are imputed based upon asset shares
equations estimated for those who have complete data.27 It is
expected that assets will have a positive impact upon retirement
probabilities for the reasons noted previously.
Private pensions are entered via indicators for eligibility.
Eligibility indicators for both full and reduced pension benefits are
considered with both expected to increase the probability of
retirement. Ideally, the dollar amounts of these pensions would be
available, but the RHS data on pensions would require considerable
cleaning to support such calculations. I decided that the
eligibility indicators were preferable to additional imputation based
upon general pension tables or estimated values.
Social Security benefits are entered in two ways. First, a
measure of the benefits that the individual would receive if he
retired at age 62 is calculated. In computing these benefits, the
Social Security rules for the given year and cohort are applied to
the individual earnings records. First, AMWs are calculated based
priority for future research.
2 7These data, as well as the original RHS extract, were generously
provided by Beverly Hirtle.
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upon earnings histories, then the appropriate PIA is calculated. One
advantage to using the RHS is that it contains matched earnings
records for individuals from 1951-1974 so that benefit levels can,
for the most part, be calculated on the basis of actual earnings. If
appropriate, PIAs are also computed for spouses based upon their
earnings histories. I then calculate benefit levels using the
appropriate rules for one or two-earner housholds. Note that it is
very important to match properly the age and cohort with the
contemporaneous law since the period of observation is one of greatly
varying Social Security rules and benefit levels. I approximate the
effects of ABR by calculating benefit levels were the individual to
retire at age 65, and then looking at the difference between the two
levels. The corresponding "delta" variables are entered into the
specification along with the age 62 benefit levels. 28
Descriptive statistics for the control and economic variables
are presented below in table 5.
5. Results
In this section, I present results for several models of
28The use of age 65 for the delta calculation results from the
institutional importance of ages 62 and 65 for the computation of
Social Security benefits. Delta variables are also calculated for
ages 64 and 66. While these variables were not used in the
estimation procedure, the high correlation with the age-65 delta
(0.79 and 0.71) suggests that the results should not change much
using alternative measures.
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Table 5 - Variable definitions and descriptive statistics, RHS
subsample.
Mean
Variable Description (Std. Dev.)
Control Variables
General Controls
education
health
married
non-white
household
size
mandatory
retire
= years of education
- 1 if health worse than cohort
= 1 if married with
spouse present
= 1 if non-white
= number of individuals
in household
= 1 if mandatory retirement
provisions present
Occupation Controls
clerical
craft
labor
manager
professional
= 1 if clerical, service, sales
= 1 if craftsman
= 1 if laborer, operative
= 1 if manager
= 1 if professional, technical
10.805
(3.447)
0.319
(0.466)
0.890
(0.313)
0.097
(0.296)
2.532
(1.240)
0.372
(0.484)
0.219
(0.413)
0.247
(0.431)
0.292
(0.455)
0.129
(0.335)
0.067
(0.251)
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Table 5 - (continued)
Economic Variables
earnings
wealth
full pension
part pension
ss62
delta
= earnings (x $1,000)
= non-housing assets (x $10,000)
= 1 if full pension eligibility
= 1 if partial pension
eligibility
= monthly social security
benefits if retire at age 62
(x $100)
= change in social security
benefits from ss62 if
retire at 65 (x $10)
Note: Based upon author's calculations. Amounts are expressed in
real 1967 dollars.
6.926
(4.800)
1.025
(3.194)
0.141
(0.348)
0.160
(0.367)
2.295
(0.644)
2.004
(2.627)
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retirement. While the principle contribution of this paper is the
estimation of a competing risks model of retirement which allows for
correlation between risks, for purposes of comparison I estimate
single risk hazards for both the parametric and semi-parametric
models. The single risk models correspond to considering a
single-form of retirement in which an individual is classified as
retired if he either fully or partially retires. I then discuss
differences between the estimates derived from the single risk
parametric, and semi-parametric models. Two competing risk models of
retirement are considered: first, one in which the risks are assumed
to be uncorrelated, and second, a model where I allow for correlation
between the stochastic disturbances.
5.1 Single Form of Retirement
5.1.1 Parametric Baseline Hazard (Weibull)
For purposes of comparison with the competing risk case, I
calculate parameter estimates for single risk, parametric models of
retirement in both the no heterogeneity and heterogeneity cases. The
baseline hazard for the single retirement model is assumed to be
simple Weibull (A(t) = a t ). The results are presented in table
6.
Interpretation of the coefficients in table 6 is aided by the
fact that log ta has an extreme value distribution so that ta is
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Table 6 - Parameter estimates for single form of retirement model,
weibull baseline hazard.
Variable No Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Variables
constant
education
health
married
non-white
household
size
mandatory
retire
clerical
craft
labor
manager
-6.780 -7.381 -7.873 -9.584 -10.518 -10.790
(0.187) (0.208) (0.223) (0.330) (0.341) (0.366)
-0.035 -0.046 -0.026
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
0.339 0.353 0.334
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
0.109 -0.344 -0.319
(0.073) (0.088) (0.092)
-0.231 -0.159 -0.159
(0.084) (0.088) (0.090)
0.024 0.023 0.025
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
0.525 0.435 0.396
(0.052) (0.052) (0.054)
0.024
(0.122)
----- ----- 0.364
(0.119)
0.393
(0.114)
----- 
-0.113
(0.134)
professional ----- -0.070
(0.146)
-0.042 -0.054 -0.034
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
0.463 0.495 0.483
(0.095) (0.098) (0.095)
-0.073 -0.582 -0.533
(0.127) (0.156) (0.153)
-0.248 -0.164 -0.164
(0.146) (0.152) (0.151)
0.059 0.071 0.062
(0.034) (0.066) (0.064)
0.542 0.411 0.382
(0.094) (0.098) (0.097)
----- ----- 0.074
(0.200)
----- ----- 0.336
(0.202)
----- 
----- 0.436
(0.195)
----- 
-0.184
(0.229)
-0.093
(0.253)
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Table 6 - (continued)
Variable No Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Variables
earnings
wealth
full pension
part pension
0.006 -0.013 -0.007 0.006 -0.017 -0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
0.002 0.015 0.022 -0.001 0.023 0.031
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
0.073 0.065 0.046 0.066 0.063 0.072
(0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.123) (0.127) (0.123)
0.015 0.006 0.033 0.099 0.055 0.044
(0.059) (0.062) (0.067) (0.113) (0.117) (0.115)
ss62
delta
(ss65-ss62)
----- 0.488 0.450
(0.051) (0.053)
-0.019 -0.023
(0.010) (0.010)
----- 0.635 0.588
(0.091) (0.091)
----- -0.077 -0.075
(0.018) (0.018)
----- ----- 0.905 0.954 0.914
(0.045) (0.044) (0.046)
3.097 3.190 3.251 4.752 5.040 4.952
(0.061) (0.064) (0.065) (0.152) (0.155) (0.155)
log
likelihood
-3689.19 -3648.42 -3622.58 -3603.82 -3562.64 -3550.29
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Retirement is
defined to be the first occurence of either full or partial
retirement. The expected value of the duration E(t) is given by the
expression E(t) = r(1 + 1/a) exp(-Xp/a) where r is the incomplete
gamma function. This implies that dln(E(t))/dX = -p/a so that a
unit change in the independent variables yields a percentage change
in the expected duration of -p/a. Note that these durations are
normalized with age 58 equal to 1.
Other
a
alpha
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distributed as a standardized exponential. It follows that E(t) =
r(1/a + 1) exp(-Xp/a) where r is the incomplete gamma function, so
that log E(t) = log p(1/a + 1) - Xp/a. Then a unit change in X
results in a percentage change in the mean duration of -p/a. Note
that these percentage changes are calculated with age 58 normalized
to be 1.
In general, the results are similar to those obtained in
previous studies. The economic variables have, for the most part,
the expected signs. Both Social Security and the Social Security
delta have strong, precisely measured effects upon retirement. A $25
increase in monthly Social Security benefits reduces the normalized
mean retirement age by about 13 percent in specification (3) (-p/a =
0.450/3.215). Since the mean of the normalized age is about 8, a
rough calculation indicates that this corresponds to a change in the
mean age of a little over a year (dt/t = .13 ; dt = .13 x 8). In
contrast, an identical increase in the Social Security delta has
about half that effect in raising the average duration. Once Social
Security benefits are accounted for, additional earnings reduce
slightly the probability of retiring, in specification (2) raising
E(t) by about 2 months for every $2,500 increase. It is interesting
to note that the impact of earnings drops by about a half with the
addition of occupation controls, suggesting that it is difficult to
disentangle earnings effects from those resulting from job class.
Additional wealth and pension eligibility all increase the retirement
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hazards, but these parameters are estimated with considerable error.
It may be that the RHS data are not sufficiently rich to support
strong inferences about the effects of these variables, or that the
effects are relatively small.
Consider next the influence of the control variables. Health
status is one of the more important of these variables. Focusing for
a moment on specification (2), bad health reduces the mean age of
retirement by approximately 10 percent (-p/a = 0.353/3.190), or about
11 months. Similarly, the presence of mandatory retirement
provisions on the primary job strongly increases retirement
probabilities. In contrast, additional education, being married and
non-white all increase the mean retirement age. The coefficient on
education, implying about a 1 month increase in the mean age per year
of additional schooling, is small relative to the findings of HW and
DH, but the magnitude may result from the attempt to estimate
separately the impact of race and education. The occupation control
variables in specification (3) suggest that being a laborer or craft
worker strongly increase the probability of retirement, with the
effect comparable to that resulting from bad health. Other
occupation variables suggest more moderate effects, with managers and
professionals experiencing a lower retirement hazard, and clerical
workers a higher hazard. The latter occupation parameters are,
however, measured imprecisely. These results are relatively
consistent across specifications.
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5.1.2 Semi-Parametric Baseline Hazard
The results of estimation of the semi-parametric likelihood for
the single form of retirement model are given in table 7 for the
no-heterogeneity specification. I consider this model to see whether
estimating a semi-parametric baseline hazard yields results that
differ appreciably from those given by the Weibull specification.
The parameter estimates for the p in table 7 are similar to
those for the Weibull-parametric hazard presented in table 6. If
there is a pattern to the differences, it is that the effects of
independent variables are almost always smaller in the
semi-parametric baseline hazard model than in the Weibull model. For
example, comparing specification (3) in tables 6 and 7, the effects
of Social Security benefits are about 10 percent lower in the
semi-parametric case; the parameter for health status is also about
10 percent lower. Similar differences are found for the effects of
most of the variables, the exceptions being those for the imprecisely
measured pension benefits. The result that estimating the baseline
hazard semi-parametrically lowers parameter estimates is intuitive,
since allowing more variation in the estimated baseline hazard will
reduce the apparent influence of covariates.
The estimated baseline hazard rate for the semi-parametric model
is compared with the corresponding Weibull hazard rate in figure 3.
While similar up through age 65, the estimates differ markedly in the
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Table 7 - Parameter estimates for single form of retirement model,
semi-parametric baseline hazard without heterogeneity controls.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Control Variables
education
health
married
non-white
household
size
mandatory
retire
-0.031
(0.009)
0.310
(0.059)
0.090
(0.085)
-0.202
(0.095)
0.015
(0.022)
0.475
(0.058)
-0.041
(0.009)
0.327
(0.059)
-0.308
(0.101)
-0.143
(0.098)
0.015
(0.022)
0.398
(0.057)
clerical
craft
labor
manager
professional
-0.024
(0.011)
0.318
(0.059)
-0.287
(0.103)
-0.141
(0.099)
0.015
(0.022)
0.367
(0.058)
0.023
(0.141)
0.284
(0.140)
0.312
(0.136)
-0.115
(0.157)
-0.054
(0.173)
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Table 7 - (continued)
Variable 1(1) (2) (3)
Economic Variables
earnings 0.004 -0.013 -0.009
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
wealth 0.001 0.013 0.020
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
full pension 0.071 0.062 0.053
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080)
part pension 0.041 0.031 0.050
(0.072) (0.073) (0.075)
ss62 0.433 0.407
(0.057) (0.059)
delta (ss65-ss62) ----- -0.018 -0.022
(0.012) (0.012)
log likelihood -3501.65 -3468.95 -3452.11
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 3 - Estimated Hazard
Weibull vs.
Rates for Retirement
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post age-65 period. The Weibull, because of the simple parametric
form, shows the conditional probability of retirement to be
increasing for individuals past age 65. In contrast, the
semi-parametric model has a decreasing hazard over the same period.
The difference in post age-65 hazard rates results from the fact that
there are relatively fewer individuals retiring at those ages so that
the maximization algorithm for the Weibull places more weight upon
fitting the increasing part of the hazard. The striking difference
in the estimated baseline hazards implies that inferences about the
effects of variables upon retirement behavior will be affected by the
shapes of the hazards as well as differences in the coefficients
between the two specifications.
Given the semi-parametric estimates of the baseline hazard, the
assumption of a Weibull hazard rate can be tested using standard
minimum X2 techniques. Denoting the semiparametric estimates as T
and the corresponding discrete points in the true baseline hazard as
A., standard maximum likelihood theorems show that, asymptotically,
T ~N(A,,Z), where a is the appropriate block of the inverse of the
Fisher information matrix. I fit a two-parameter Weibull to this
model, g(a,) = t . Then the quadratic form
W (r-g(a,7))' 2 (r-g(ai))
is distributed under the null hypothesis of the Weibull specification
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as asymptotic x2 with k-2 degrees of freedom where k is the number of
parameters in the estimated baseline hazard. The value of W is
estimated to be 166, which is well in excess of a 5% critical value
for the x2 so that the Weibull assumption is rejected.29
To see the importance of the difference in hazard rates implied
by the two models, I perform a crude simulation of the effects of a
large change in the Social Security system. Starting with the sample
of 381 individuals who were 58 years old in 1969, I first calculate
the sample survivor function for those individuals given their actual
Social Security benefits, calculated under the rules that were in
effect for that cohort.30 For comparison, I then calculate the
survivor function under the relevant Social Security law for 1969.
The simulation yields an approximate measure of the extent of labor
force participation were the system to have remained unchanged. The
differences between the two estimates of the survivor function and
the corresponding hazards provide a rough measure of the impact of
the changes in Social Security law in the early 1970s.
The simulated survivor functions for the Weibull and
semi-parametric estimates are presented in table 8. For both models,
29
A natural alternative test is to perform a Hausman-type
specification test of the p (Hausman (1978]). Under the null
hypothesis of a Weibull specification, the parametric model is both
consistent and efficient for the p, while the semi-parametric is
consistent under the null and the alternative, but not efficient.
30 In the remainder of the discussion, these rules will be referred to
as those existing under "current law".
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Table 8 - Estimated sample survivor functions under current and
1969 Social Security law, various models. Averages over 381
individuals
Single Risk Models
Weibull
Current Law
0.9987
0.9873
0.9535
0.8865
0.7821
0.6463
0.4956
0.3508
0.2289
0.1381
0.0774
0.0404
0.0197
0.0090
1969 Law
0.9989
0.9900
0.9631
0.9091
0.8226
0.7057
0.5685
0.4271
0.2982
0.1933
0.1165
0.0654
0.0343
0.0168
Extreme Value
Current Law 1969 Law
0.9961
0.9915
0.9731
0.9416
0.8300
0.6969
0.5221
0.2942
0.1568
0.0963
0.0700
0.0504
0.0374
0.0287
Independent Competing Risks Model
Full Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.9974
0.9937
0.9862
0.9710
0.9248
0.8571
0.7905
0.6056
0.4661
0.4001
0.3550
0.3209
0.2826
0.2652
0.9982
0.9956
0.9902
0.9791
0.9451
0.8946
0.8433
0.6904
0.5629
0.4982
0.4520
0.4159
0.3742
0.3547
Partial Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.9993
0.9906
0.9795
0.9302
0.8815
0.7577
0.6796
0.5839
0.4763
0.4247
0.3647
0.3363
0.2851
0.2728
Age
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
0.9969
0.9931
0.9781
0.9523
0.8592
0.7444
0.5859
0.3612
0.2101
0.1372
0.1034
0.0771
0.0590
0.0466
Age
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
0.9991
0.9881
0.9740
0.9120
0.8518
0.7029
0.6124
0.5055
0.3910
0.3384
0.2795
0.2525
0.2053
0.1942
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Table 8 - (continued)
Correlated Competing Risks Model
Full Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.9941
0.9869
0.9719
0.9401
0.8420
0.7113
0.5854
0.3191
0.1828
0.1273
0.0952
0.0741
0.0548
0.0464
0.9964
0.9916
0.9811
0.9574
0.8780
0.7632
0.6454
0.3751
0.2245
0.1601
0.1218
0.0960
0.0720
0.0615
Partial Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.9980
0.9980
0.9796
0.9594
0.8678
0.7762
0.5779
0.4485
0.2880
0.1782
0.1405
0.1046
0.0895
0.0657
0.9978
0.9978
0.9777
0.9560
0.8592
0.7640
0.5613
0.4313
0.2724
0.1656
0.1293
0.0951
0.0809
0.0586
Note: The sample survivor functions are calculated by averaging the
survivor functions for individuals across the 381 individuals in the
youngest cohort of the sample. The calculation for 1969 law
involves simulating benefits for individuals over time, given no
change from the 1969 rules, and then computing the implied survival
probabilities.
Age
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
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the change in Social Security law has moderate effects upon survival
probabilities, with changes in survivor rates mostly in the range of
4-7 percent. Of the two specifications, the Weibull model generally
yields larger changes in the survivor function. These changes in the
survivor function are presented graphically in figure 4. The results
indicate that the changes in the Social Security system have had
moderate effects upon retirement probabilities. The Weibull model
simulation yields survivor probabilities for a 62 year old individual
that are about 4 percentage points higher under 1969 law than under
the actual law (82.26-78.21) implying higher participation rates
under the earlier law. The gap between the Weibull survivor
functions for the two laws peaks at age 65 at around 7.5 percent,
then decreases smoothly to less than 1 percent at age 71.
As noted above, despite a similar age-profile, the changes in
survivor functions associated with the semi-parametric model are
generally smaller than those for the Weibull model. The differences
result directly from the smaller parameter estimates for the Social
Security and the delta variables in the semi-parametric model. The
differences between the two simulations are sizeable since for the
ages 61-67, the response of the Weibull survivor is almost uniformly
one percentage point higher. Thus, the semi-parametric model
generates smaller changes in participation rates resulting from
changes in the Social Security system. Once again, the fact that the
Weibull model yields larger simulated changes in the survivor
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Figure 4 - Change in Survivor Function Resulting
From Change in Social Security Law,
Single Form of Retirement Models
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function is not surprising. Estimating a proportional hazards model
with a parametric restriction on the baseline hazard means that some
of the variation over time in the baseline hazard that is not
captured by the parametric specification will instead be attributed
to the effects of covariates.
Associated with the survivor functions depicted above are
simulated values for the sample hazard rates. These hazard rates are
given in table 9. Changes in the hazard rates resulting from changes
in the Social Security rules are depicted in figure 5. The
simulation predicts moderate changes in the conditional probabilities
of retirement resulting from the change from 1969 Social Security
rules--for both models, in the 62-66 age range, the hazard rate is
from 2 to 5 percentage points higher than under 1969 law. The smooth
shape of the difference in the Weibull hazards is in contrast to the
corresponding difference in the semi-parametric hazards which
displays a sharply defined spike at age 65. In addition, the
semi-parametric model exhibits slightly larger sensitivity to the
change in Social Security law. For example, at age 65, the change
from 1969 Social Security rules to the actual rules yields in excess
of a 5 percentage point increase in the hazard rate for the
semi-parametric model, and a 4 percentage point increase under the
Weibull model.
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Table 9 - Estimated sample- hazard rates under current and 1969
Social Security law, various models. Averages over 381 individuals.
Single Risk Models
Weibull
Current Law
0.0013
0.0114
0.0114
0.0342
0.0703
0.1178
0.1736
0.2332
0.2923
0.3474
0.3966
0.4397
0.4776
0.5119
1969 Law
0.0011
0.0090
0.0090
0.0271
0.0561
0.0951
0.1421
0.1944
0.2487
0.3019
0.3518
0.3972
0.4383
0.4760
Extreme Value
Current Law 1969 Law
0.0039
0.0046
0.0186
0.0323
0.1186
0.1603
0.2508
0.4366
0.4670
0.3855
0.2738
0.2800
0.2582
0.2306
0.0031
0.0038
0.0151
0.0264
0.0978
0.1336
0.2129
0.3835
0.4183
0.3471
0.2466
0.2539
0.2352
0.2107
IndepenIdent Competing Risks odel
Full Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.0026
0.0037
0.0076
0.0154
0.0476
0.0731
0.0777
0.2339
0.2303
0.1416
0.1127
0.0961
0.1192
0.0617
0.0018
0.0026
0.0054
0.0112
0.0347
0.0535
0.0574
0.1813
0.1846
0.1150
0.0927
0.0798
0.1004
0.0522
Partial Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.0007
0.0086
0.0112
0.0504
0.0523
0.1405
0.1031
0.1408
0.1843
0.1084
0.1413
0.0778
0.1522
0.0432
0.0009
0.0110
0.0143
0.0636
0.0660
0.1748
0.1288
0.1745
0.2266
0.1344
0.1742
0.0967
0.1869
0.0538
Age
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
Age
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
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Table 9 - (continued)
Correlated Competing Risks Model
Full Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.0059
0.0073
0.0151
0.0327
0.1044
0.1552
0.1770
0.4548
0.4272
0.3034
0.2522
0.2222
0.2604
0.1527
0.0036
0.0048
0.0106
0.0242
0.0830
0.1307
0.1544
0.4188
0.4016
0.2867
0.2395
0.2118
0.2495
0.1464
Partial Retirement
Current Law 1969 Law
0.0020
0.0000
0.0185
0.0206
0.0955
0.1055
0.2555
0.2240
0.3577
0.3812
0.2120
0.2554
0.1442
0.0615
0.0022
0.0000
0.0202
0.0222
0.1013
0.1108
0.2652
0.2318
0.3683
0.3922
0.2191
0.2642
0.1497
0.0615
Note: Rates are calculated by averaging the hazard rates for
individuals across the 381 individuals in the youngest cohort of the
sample. The calculation for 1969 law involves simulating benefits
for individuals over time, given no change from the 1969 rules, and
then computing the implied hazard rates.
Age
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Figure 5 - Change in Hazard Rates Resulting
From Change in Social Security Law,
Single Form of Retirement Models
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5.2 Full and Partial Retirement (Competing-Risks)
Having shown that the semi-parametric model offers advantages
over the commonly used Weibull form of the hazard, I now consider a
more complete model of retirement behavior which accounts for the
presence of partial retirement. These models are the
semi-parameteric extension of the HW and DH studies to the competing
risk framework.
5.2.1 Independent Risks
The previous models considered the possibility of only one form
of retirement. One way to model the presence of two forms of
retirement is to consider a competing risks model in which the
baseline hazards are assumed to be independent. The specification is
equivalent to specifying a model of the form given in (3.2.6) with
independent errors. As shown by Kalbfleisch and Prentice [1980) such
a model has a likelihood that factors into two separate parts, one
for each hazard. The estimation technique then requires a separate
estimate for each risk in which failures of the alternative type are
treated as censored failures.
An independent, semi-parametric baseline hazard model is
estimated for both full and partial retirement. The results for the
specification with all the covariates present are given in the first
two columns of table 10. These parameters can be compared directly
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Table 10 - Parameter estimates for full and partial retirement
models, with correlated and independent semi-parametric baseline
hazards.
Independent Correlated
Variable (2) (3)
Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial
Control Variables
education
health
married
non-white
household
size
mandatory
retire
clerical
craft
labor
manager
-0.020 -0.028 -0.034 -0.032 -0.019 -0.021
(0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
0.474 -0.012 0.368 0.268 0.384 0.220
(0.073) (0.100) (0.064) (0.087) (0.065) (0.098)
-0.480 0.001 -0.442 -0.337 -0.443 -0.300
(0.134) (0.178) (0.100) (0.113) (0.100) (0.117)
-0.012 -0.350 -0.089 -0.169 -0.087 -0.177
(0.123) (0.164) (0.098) (0.099) (0.102) (0.099)
0.017 0.010 0.044 0.037 0.041 0.034
(0.026) (0.038) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024)
0.466 0.081 0.305 0.218 0.293 0.164
(0.071) (0.101) (0.064) (0.082) (0.065) (0.086)
0.073 -0.029
(0.188) (0.233)
0.164 0.465
(0.189) (0.228)
0.407 0.115
(0.182) (0.225)
-0.097 -0.090
(0.205) (0.266)
----- ----- -0.022 -0.064
(0.118) (0.135)
----- 0.081 0.176
(0.124) (0.138)
----- ----- 0.221 0.121
(0.116) (0.141)
----- ----- -0.218 -0.196
(0.138) (0.155)
----- -0.209 
-0.038
(0.159) (0.174)
profess- -0.208 0.236
ional (0.234) (0.277)
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Table 10 (continued)
Independent Correlated
Variable (2) (3)
Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial
Economic Variables
earnings 0.001 -0.028 -0.009 -0.014 -0.003 -0.012
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
wealth 0.009 0.036 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.022
(0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
full 0.111 -0.065 0.077 0.037 0.090 0.032
pension (0.097) (0.131) (0.078) (0.082) (0.080) (0.083)
part -0.057 0.201 0.022 0.071 0.006 0.079
pension (0.096) (0.117) (0.073) (0.076) (0.075) (0.080)
ss62 0.587 0.084 0.411 0.310 0.411 0.257
(0.077) (0.100) (0.065) (0.078) (0.067) (0.085)
delta 0.020 -0.100 -0.039 -0.061 -0.035 -0.071
(ss65-ss62) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017)
Other
p ----- 0.935 0.842
(0.119) (0.197)
log -2616.14 -1799.50 -4341.15 -4319.47
likelihood
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
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to the parameters for the single form of retirement model presented
in table 7. There is considerable variation across risks in the
parameters, with the single risk estimates appearing to be a
combination of the competing risk estimates. Almost uniformly, the
parameters for the single form of retirement model lie in the
interval bounded by the full and partial retirement estimates. The
parameter estimates indicate that treating both full and partial
retirement as a single form of retirement convolutes the separate
influences of exogenous variables upon the retirement decision.
First, notice that the results for Social Security benefits
differ across the type of retirement. Additional Social Security
benefits provide significant, positive incentives for full retirement
but not for partial retirement. The Social Security delta reduces
the conditional probabilities of partial retirement, but has little
effect on the full retirement hazard. The increases in the
probability of retirement resulting from larger benefits are
expected, but the finding that there is variation across types of
retirement is new and informative. One implication of the
differential impact is that policies designed to increase benefit
levels and increase marginal incentives through higher deltas will
have the effect of moving some individuals from partial retirement
into full retirement. The strong effect of the Social Security delta
in reducing the partial retirement hazard is expected, but the lack
of effect for full retirement is somewhat puzzling. This result
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suggests that individuals who can better adjust their behavior
marginally, in the sense of being inclined to partially retire, will
be more responsive to the incentive effects of Social Security. The
general conclusion to be drawn from these results is that changes in
the Social Security system affect the probabilities of full
retirement primarily through benefit levels while affecting partial
retirement through changes in the delta variable.
Furthermore, there are significant differences in the parameters
for the economic variables in the competing risks case. While the
earnings effects are small and imprecisely estimated in the single
risk model, I find a small, but significant negative effect of
earnings upon partial retirement and little effect upon full
retirement. The result is a little surprising, since it is expected
that earnings will have a negative effect for both forms of
retirement. One possible interpretation for the stronger effect upon
partial retirement is that individuals with high current earnings are
more likely to be subject to the earnings test in a partial
retirement job so that the high implicit marginal tax rates
discourage that form of retirement. These implicit marginal tax
rates are, of course, not effective for an individual who is fully
retired and out of the labor force. Wealth, which is estimated
imprecisely in the single-retirement model, has a small and
statistically significant, positive impact upon partial retirement
probabilities. The impact of additional assets upon full retirement
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probabilities is still unclear, as is the reason for the difference
between the results for full and partial retirement.
Focusing upon the parameter estimates for the control variables,
note that health status significantly increases the probability of
full retirement, but not the probability of partial retirement.
Similarly, being non-white reduces substantially the partial
retirement hazard, but not the full retirement hazard. Both the
health and non-white results make sense if one thinks of an
individual receiving partial retirement job offers from some
distribution. Having poor health will increase the desire for
leisure, leading to higher probabilities of full and partial
retirement. With poor health, however, an individual is likely to
have a reduced set of partial retirement opportunities so that the
probability of partially retiring should increase by a smaller
amount. The different effects are not captured in structural models
which assume that an individual has a single partial retirement wage
offer independent of health status. In the same vein, a non-white
individual is expected to have a reduced probability of partial
retirement because of poorer job opportunities.
The variation across risks in the parameters for the occupation
variables are consistent with the search interpretation of the
partial retirement decision. Recall that in the single form of
retirement model, the probability of retiring is increased for
laborers. The single risk measlre of the occupation effect masks
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variation between the effects on the full and partial retirement
hazards. For the competing risks model, the conditional probability
of retirement is increased for both full and partial retirement, but
by a large, statistically significant amount for full retirement, and
a smaller imprecisely measured amount for partial retirement. The
larger effect for full retirement accords with the notion that
laborers are likely to have relatively few acceptable reduced work
opportunities so that full retirement is encouraged relative to
partial retirement. The opposite seems to be true for craft
individuals, with the partial retirement effect dominating the change
in the full retirement hazard.
In general, the greater sensitivity of partial retirement to
changes in the delta variable, as well as the different impacts of
health, mandatory retirement and occupation status upon the relative
retirement probabilities, suggest that a large part of full
retirement behavior may not result from responses to economic
incentives. Instead, the decision to retire fully may originate in
physical and institutional contraints upon continued work. A case
can be made for this interpretation given the strong effects of
health and occupation upon the full retirement hazards.
I perform simulations to show the quantitative impact of
differences across risks in the effects of Social Security variables.
I again consider the survivor functions and hazard rates for the
sample of individuals aged 58 in 1969 under both current and 1969
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law. The simulation results for the survivor and hazard functions
for full and partial retirement are presented in table 8. Figure 6
shows the changes in the "marginal" survivor functions for the two
forms of retirement. The lower graph shows that the survivor
function for full retirement is substantially lower under current
law. For example, the sample full retirement survivor function is 5
percent lower at age 64. The difference between the survivor
function under the two regimes peaks at nearly 10 percent at age 67.
The upper portion of the graph shows the corresponding calculation
for partial retirement. Unlike the case for full retirement,
individuals have a larger partial retirement survivor function under
current law. The difference ranges from 1 percent at age 59 to 9
percent at age 67. While it is difficult to generalize based upon
figure 6 without taking into account the potentially latent nature of
the failure times for the two forms of retirement, the results from
this specification indicate that the change in Social Security law
has increased the probability of early retirement (before age 65) by
around 10 percent.31
The different simulation results for the two forms of retirement
are also seen in the changes in hazard rates. The rates are
31To be precise, the interpretation of these changes in survivor
functions as changes in labor force participation rates is not
correct, since the latent nature of the risk process is ignored.
These numbers do, however, provide a useful sense of the
responsiveness of retirement probabilities to various factors.
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Figure 6 - Change in Survivor Functions Resulting
From Change in Social Security Law,
Independent Competing-Risk Model
9
8
7
5 -
4-
3-
0
-2
c-3
-4
-5
-6
-7 -\
58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Age
N Full Retirement + Partial Retirement
- 84 -
presented in table 9 and the change in rates from 1969 law to current
law are depicted in figure 7. The results are reflective of the
differences in parameter estimates across risks as well as the
different shapes of the estimated baseline hazard rates. For the
ages 62-66, the changes in the Social Security system from 1969 rules
reduce the conditional probability of partial retirement by between 2
and 4 percentage points. In contrast, over the same interval, the
conditional probability of full retirement increases by a slightly
larger amount. At age 65 the hazard rate for full retirement is a
full 5 percent higher under current law.
These results are quite striking in that they suggest that the
recent changes in Social Security law have indeed altered retirement
probabilities, but in difgerent ways across retirement types. The
simulation results indicate that changes in full retirement
probabilities have resulted primarily through benefit levels while
the partial retirement probabilities have been motivated by increases
in the marginal return to continued work. While the magnitude of
these effects changes under the specification of correlated risks
considered in the following section, this basic result is invariant
to the independence assumption.
5.2.2 Correlated Risks
The final model to be considered allows for correlation between
the error terms in (3.2.6). To allow for non-independent baseline
- 85 -
Figure 7 - Change in Hazard Rates Resulting
From Change in Social Security Law,
Independent Competing-Risk Model
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hazards, I assume that (e ,62) are distributed as a bivariate normal
with correlation coefficient p. Parameter estimates for the
bivariate model are given in table 10. Once scaled for the unequal
variances, the parameters from the bivariate normal model are
comparable to the extreme value parameters for the independent
competing risks model of the previous section. 3 2
The estimates for p in table 10 are sensitive to the model
specification. For the two reported specifications, p is 0.935 and
0.842. While estimated with considerable precision, the parameter
estimate changes considerably when occupation class is considered.
Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the two point estimates, it
seems likely that there is a strong positive correlation between e1
and 233
An examination of the parameter estimates for the covariates
reveals the importance of taking the correlation into account.
Focusing on specification (3) in table 10, the estimates for the two
risks are closer than the corresponding estimates for the independent
32The variance of the logit model is 12 /3. The extreme value
parameters in the first two columns of table 10 should then be
multiplied by 0.551 to allow for comparison with the probit estimates
in the latter columns. Amemiya [1981] suggests that the logit
parameters be scaled down by a factor of 0.625 since this seems to
provide a better correspondence between the two models.
33p is estimated as a non-linear function of an estimated parameter.
I suspect that the precision of the estimate of p is overstated,
resulting from the impreciseness of the first-order approximation
used to derive the asymptotic standard error.
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competing risks model. For example, after scaling, the parameters
for Social Security benefits in the independent risk case are 0.367
and 0.053 for the full retirement and partial retirement risks,
respectively. 3 The corresponding parameters in the bivariate model
are 0.411 and 0.257. The difference of 0.314 for the independent
model is considerably larger than the latter difference of 0.154.
The use of an independent risk model will therefore overstate
differences between the two forms of retirement.
Furthermore, the bivariate model allows for more precise
estimates of the effects of Social Security upon the alternative
forms of retirement. The parameters for Social Security benefits and
the Social Security delta all have the expected sign and are
statistically significant. Despite the fact that the size of the
differences across risks in parameter estimates are less striking,
the basic character of the results of the previous section still
holds: additional benefits have a stronger positive impact upon the
probability of fully retiring than upon the probability of partially
retiring; a larger delta reduces the partial retirement hazard by
more than the full retirement hazard.
The magnitude of the effects of Social Security benefits and the
Social Security delta on the relative probabilities of retirement are
best seen by considering simulation results. I again use the
3 4For these comparisons, I use the Amemiya scaling factor described
earlier.
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benefits and deltas computed under 1969 law for comparison. The
simulated sample survivor functions are given in table 8, the
survivor function comparisons in figure 8, and the hazard rate
comparisons in figure 9. The lower portion of figure 8 shows that
the change in Social Security rules has reduced the full retirement
survivor function. The probability that the latent failure time for
full retirement is greater than 63 falls by over 5 percentage points;
at age 64, the reduction is about 6 percent. These reductions are
considerably smaller than the corresponding responses for the
independent dual risk model. In contrast to the 10 percent increase
in early retirement generated by the independent risk model, the
reduction here is a little under 6 percentage points. Furthermore,
the distribution of these changes differs greatly, with the change in
full retirement survivor function for the bivariate model possessing
a well-defined mode at age 64. The upper portion of figure 8 shows
the corresponding increase in the partial retirement survivor
function. Again, the responses, on the order of 1 to 2 percentage
points, are considerably smaller than those for the independent
model.
The simulated hazard functions in figure 9 show the same general
pattern. The change in Social Security law has reduced the
conditional probabilities of partial retirement, while increasing the
full retirement hazards. As reflected in the survivor function
simulation above, the increase in full retirement hazards ranges from
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Figure 8 - Change in Survivor Functions Resulting
From Change in Social Security Law,
Correlated Competing-Risk Model
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Figure 9 - Change in Hazard Rates Resulting
From Change in Social Security Law,
Correlated Competing-Risk Model
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2 to 3.5 percentage points from age 62 to 65, a smaller change than
for the independent dual risk model. Similarly, the reductions in
partial retirement hazards are relatively small, about 1 percent
versus the 2-4 percent changes derived under the independence
.35
assumption.
The larger predicted effects under the assumption of independent
risks seem to result directly from the lack of accounting for the
correlation between risks. As an illustration, note that the
survivor function estimates in table 8 for the two models are very
different, especially in the upper tail of the age-distribution. The
differences in the survivors can be attributed to the fact that the
independent model treats failure of alternative types as censored
observations when calculating the risk for a given failure. In
contrast, the correlated model uses the information about the
correlation to more precisely calculate the true probabilities of
survival, in essence using the information that partial retirement is
more like full retirement than it is like the censoring category.
Finally, the simulation results for the various models are
summarized in table 11 where the percentage change in early
retirement is presented for both the single and dual risk models.
Notice first that the predicted responses of full retirement to the
I also calculated the minimum X2 test for the two semi-parametric
baseline hazards against the two-parameter Weibull specifications.
The resulting value of 271 is larger than the 5% critical value for
k +k 2-4 = 24 df.
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Table 11 - Estimated changes in survivor probabilities and hazard
rates resulting from changes from 1969 Social Security law, various
models and ages, 381 individuals.
Age 62 Age 65 Age 70
Change in Survivor Probability x 100
Sinale Risk
Weibull
Semi-Parametric -4.056 -7.636 -1.456
(Extreme) -2.921 -6.708 -2.163
Dual Risk
Independent
Full -2.035 -8.476 -9.153
Partial 2.973 7.842 7.984
Correlated
Full -3.603 -5.596 -1.726
Partial 0.863 1.722 0.861
Change in Hazard Rates x 100
Single Risk
Weibull 1.416 3.875 3.926
Semi-Parametric 2.077 5.312 2.307
(Extreme)
Dual Risk
Independent
Full 1.284 5.259 1.883
Partial -1.372 -3.379 -3.466
Correlated
Full 2.145 3.602 1.085
Partial -0.577 -0.777 -0.557
Note: These changes are calculated from the numbers presented in
tables 8 and 9. The survivor probabilities are computed by applying
the estimated baseline hazard for the model is question and the
estimated p to actual individual-level data and to data simulated on
the basis of 1969 law. The resulting survivor functions and hazard
rates are then averaged over the youngest RHS cohort.
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Social Security reforms fall across specifications, first as the
Weibull specification is relaxed, and then as partial retirement, and
correlated partial retirement are considered. A similar result is
observed for the response of partial retirement when the independence
assumption is removed.
Conclusion
I will not dwell excessively upon the results since they have
been already been discussed at some length. In short, I find that
Social Security affects full and partial retirement in different
ways. As a result, the recent increases in Social Security benefits
are shown to have increased the probability of full retirement and
reduced the probability of partial retirement. The semi-parametric
competing risks model employed in this study appears to be superior
to previously used duration models. The relative absence of
functional form restrictions yields predicted changes in retirement
probabilities that are smaller than those estimated with
restrictions.
The finding that partial retirement behavior differs
substantively from full retirement behavior is of particular interest
since, given current trends in mortality and morbidity, partial
retirement is likely to become of greater importance in the future.
As the general health level of the elderly rises and institutional
constraints upon work by the elderly are relaxed, delayed and partial
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Chapter 2
Unemployment Insurance Benefits and the
Duration of Unemployment Spells:
Evidence from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation
Introduct ion
The factors that influence unemployment have, for some time,
been the subject of considerable academic scrutiny. This attention
has touched on a variety of topics but has, in recent years, focused
upon two issues: the relevance of a search interpretation in
explaining unemployment durations, and the role of unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits in altering the length and frequency of
unemployment spells. Despite advances in both economic theory and
econometric technique, much of the existing empirical work has been
handicapped by data limitations which hamper the simultaneous study
of these issues.
In this paper, I address jointly the issues of the impact of UI
benefits upon exit from unemployment and the forms that exit takes.
The primary contribution of this chapter is the development of a new
sample of unemployment spells from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) which allows for the estimation of a competing
risk model of exit from unemployment in which individuals either are
recalled to their previous employer or find a new job. The use of
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the SIPP in this study solves a number of the data problems that have
plagued previous researchers and provides a platform for further work
in the analysis of the nature of unemployment.
I find that unemployment benefits generally have a significant
and precisely measured impact upon exit rates from unemployment. The
basic result that UI is negatively related to hazards holds whether
unemployment spells are analyzed in a single or in a competing risk
framework and whether UI benefits are represented by an indicator
variable, by replacement rates, or by actual benefit levels. In the
competing risks framework, the effects differ across risks with the
recall hazard more sensitive to UI. I also find that the use of
measures which incorporate information about the extent of benefits
improve the explanatory power of the model relative to the use of
receipt indicators.
Furthermore, the results suggest that UI benefit exhaustion has
important effects upon the exit hazard. In particular, I find
evidence of a spike in the exit hazard at 39 weeks. Given the
precision of the SIPP weekly data on employment status and the
presence of spikes in the estimated hazard at exhaustion points, I
conclude that the increases in exit hazards coincident with benefit
exhaustion points are not the result of discrete responses by
individuals to survey questions.
There is mixed support in the data for a search model of new job
findings. While the overall hazard rate is estimated to be a
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decreasing function of duration, the new job hazard for exit from
unemployment appears to be increasing over time, at least for the
first few months. The shape of this hazard is estimated with
considerable error so that strong conclusions should not be drawn
based upon these results. Nevertheless, the finding of an increasing
new job hazard supports the findings of Katz [1986] and Han and
Hausman (1986J for a sample from a different survey. On the other
hand, the large errors associated with the estimates, the
non-monotonicity of the hazard, and the relatively small number of
new job findings in the data suggest that the findings of increasing
hazards from these previous studies may not be robust across
alternative data sources.
More generally, the results from the SIPP suggest that the
recent concern with the duration of a single unemployment spell may
be somewhat missplaced. A large percentage of the individuals who
experience a spell of unemployment during the 16 month period
experience multiple spells. This result suggests that a more general
analysis of durations that incorporates information about spell
frequency is needed.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. In
section 1, I outline some of the basic issues in the study of
unemployment spells. The discussion is brief since much of this
material should be quite familiar. In sections 2 and 3, the
development of the SIPP data set is discussed and descriptive
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statistics are presented. The latter section also includes the
empirical hazard rates for exit from unemployment. This discussion
is followed by results from both single risk, semi-parametric
estimation and competing risk models. There is a brief conclusion in
section 4.
1. Background
The analysis of unemployment durations has proceeded along two
related dimensions. First, many analysts have focused their efforts
on examining the nature of duration dependence; more specifically, on
determining whether hazards are increasing or decreasing with
duration length. Also of interest has been the issue of whether
state unemployment insurance (UI) systems provide incentives for
individuals to prolong job search, thereby increasing the pool of
unemployed individuals and observable unemployment.
Much of the recent empirical literature has focused upon
reconciling observed hazard rates with the theoretical framework of
job search models. At the center of the discrepancy is the fact that
reemployment hazards are invariably estimated to be decreasing over
time. The decreasing hazards are in direct contrast to the
predictions of standard models of job search (McCall [1970],
Mortensen [1977], Burdett and Mortensen [1980], Pissarides (1982]).
In these models, the optimal individual search strategy is to set a
reservation wage and to compare arriving job offers to this
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reservation wage. It can be shown that the reservation wage will,
for a variety of reasons, decrease over time. If the wage-offer
distribution is stationary, then the result will be an increasing
hazard rate.
It has been suggested that the observed decreasing hazard rate
is explained by the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Heckman and Singer (1985] demonstrate that heterogeneity will
unambiguously bias the hazard rate downward, with larger biases
occurring over time. The intuition behind the direction of the bias
is that individuals with relatively good draws from the heterogeneity
distribution are more likely to find employment early so that as time
passes, the sample selection process concentrates the sample toward
those less likely to find jobs.
An alternative explanation has been suggested by Katz (1986].
He argues that the problem results from an ambiguous definition of
reemployment. Katz notes that for individuals on layoff, there are
two potential forms of exit from unemployment: one in which
individuals find a new job, and another in which they are recalled to
their previous employer. He shows, using retrospective data on
unemployment spells, that if one estimates a competing risks,
proportional hazards model of new job and recall risk, the overall
hazard can be split up into two parts, with the decreasing portion of
the overall hazard coming from the layoff component, and with the new
job hazard increasing over time as predicted by theory.
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Despite these and other important advances in the study of
hazard models of unemployment, it is important to note that the
duration framework is ill-suited to an examination of the causes of
unemployment. The basic hazard framework focuses attention on the
narrow question of what factors influence the length of a spell,
ignoring possible interactions between spell length and frequency.
This emphasis on chronic unemployment has persisted despite evidence
that much unemployment is related to employment instability (Hall
(1972], Marston (1975], Clark and Summers [1976]).
A second branch of the unemployment literature has examined the
extent to which state UI insurance schemes have increased the
frequency and duration of unemployment spells. Feldstein [1978] for
one, has argued that the existence of UI provides a subsidy to
search, thereby increasing the duration of any given unemployment
spell. Furthermore, Topel (1983] has noted that the increase in
observed unemployment resulting from UI has two components, one
coming from increased durations, and the other from more frequent
layoffs resulting from imperfect firm experience ratings. The
imperfect ratings imply that the marginal benefit accruing to firms
from the layoff of an additional worker is not equal to the increased
insurance cost that is incurred. Firms with relatively high
unemployment levels may find themselves in a situation where benefit
payments exceed the statutory maximum on tax liabilities so that the
additional payment of benefits is associated with zero additional
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liability.
The relationship between individual search behavior and the
payment of UI should have empirically verifiable effects. First, UI
benefits should be positively related to spell durations. All things
equal, individuals who receive benefits are facing a lower price, in
the form of forgone wages, to continuing search. The subsidy implies
that UI benefits will increase the duration of a given spell by
increasing the reservation wage. It also implies that the hazard
rate for exit from unemployment should increase upon UI benefit
exhaustion. Additionally, since the receipt of UI benefits is
directly related to an individual's labor market state, UI represents
a direct subsidy to search so that a dollar of UI benefits should
have a stronger effect in prolonging durations than a corresponding
dollar from other income sources.
The positive impact of UI upon the average duration of an
unemployment spell is mitigated to a degree if firms with imperfect
experience ratings use the UI system to subsidize layoff. Since
firms are not paying the full insurance cost of generating
unemployment, they will tend to layoff more frequently than they
would otherwise. If these spells of unemployment are shorter than
the existing spells then the presence of a UI system might appear to
be related to shorter spells, even though aggregate unemployment has
risen. While the current study does not address the question of what
determines the frequency of unemployment spells, the impact of
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imperfect experience rating differentials across industries should
yield an observable industry component to spell duration. More
specifically, one should observe some industries with high
unemployment rates that also have high unemployment exit hazards.
2. Data Issues
The data on unemployment durations used in this paper are
derived from waves 1 through 4 of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). Administered by the Bureau of the Census, the
SIPP is a longitudinal survey of approximately 21,000 household units
selected to be representative of the non-institutional population of
the United States. The survey is designed to provide information on
income, labor force activity and participation in a variety of
transfer programs at the individual, family, and household level.
Over the course of a two and one-half year period, individuals
are sampled once every four months for a total of 9 waves of data.
Waves 1 through 4 of the SIPP cover the period from October 1983 to
December 1984, consequently, data for a given individual in this
study are available for at most 16 months. In each survey period,
questions on income receipt and labor force status are asked
pertaining to the four months preceeding the interview date.
Since the accuracy of the spells used in this analysis is
directly related to the reliability of the data both within a given
SIPP wave and acros-s the panel, it is important to note that the data
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appear to be of high quality. The designers of the survey have taken
particular care to insure that attrition is kept to a minimum and
that the data are relatively free from error. If necessary,
individuals who move are followed to new addresses. Most questioning
is conducted via personal visits subject to geographic restrictions.
Callbacks and consistency checks are conducted to minimize the amount
of missing or erroneous data.
The analysis in this paper is carried out at the level of heads
of household with individuals matched across successive waves of the
survey. Because of differences in the sampling procedure used for
wave 2, only about 3/4 of the original 21,000 households were
candidates for matching.2 There were 12,707 matches across all four
waves. Of those matches, 5,546 spells of unemployment were observed,
of which 4,222 were completed duration spells. Complete and
incomplete spells are used in this study. Since one of the focal
1Individuals who move and are not located within 100 miles of one of
the original sampling areas are subsequently interviewed by
telephone. Though I have not tabulated the sample by type of
interview, given the scope of the original survey, the number of
telephone interviews is likely to be small. Many other samples,
including, in particular, the Current Population Survey, do not
follow movers.
2The SIPP is divided into four rotation groups which are interviewed
on successive months. A typical SIPP "wave" is made up of interviews
for all four rotation groups. Wave 2, however, contains only records
for individuals in the first 3 rotation groups. This unbalanced
sampling procedure was designed so that specific questions on
personal taxes to be asked in wave 6 could be asked in the months of
May, June, July and August.
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points of this analysis is on determining the mode of exit from
unemployment, individuals for whom employer information was not
available upon completion of spell were excluded from the final
sample. Also excluded were individuals for whom job information at
the onset of the spell was not available. The resulting data set
consists of 4,224 spells, censored and uncensored, distributed among
2,282 individuals.
There are a number of reasons that the SIPP is a particularly
valuable source of information about an individual's labor force
status. Previous analyses of labor force transitions have suffered
from restrictions on the availability of key data. While not a
perfect data source, the SIPP addresses the most serious of the
difficulties.3 The following discussion focuses on the problems
associated with a variety of data sources and the ways in which the
SIPP allows one to address the most important of the difficulties.
Despite a variety of well-documented problems, the Current
Population Survey (CPS) is the most widely used source of information
on labor force transitions. Prior to the introduction of the SIPP,
the CPS was unique in its universal coverage of the working
population. For the study of unemployment durations, however, the
3Moreover, the expected availability of the wave 3 supplement which
contains work history information promises to make the current SIPP
panel a platform for the analysis of issues that cannot be addressed
given current data. In this regard, it is the combination of the
wealth of data and the universal coverage that is of particular
value.
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monthly CPS data are severely hampered by the use of a point-in-time
sampling technique whereby spells of unemployment are only observed
while in progress. As noted by a number of researchers, this
sampling procedure results in a sample which understates the
frequency of shorter spells since longer spells are more likely to be
observed. More importantly for the analysis of durations, Poterba
and Summers [1986] have suggested that there may be serious reporting
error across successive months of the CPS leading to an overstatement
of the frequencies of labor market transitions.
Other sources of data such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) used by Katz [1986] and Han and Bausman (1986] avoid the
problems associated with the point-in-time technique by obtaining
retrospective information on unemployment experience. Individuals
are asked to report on the dates associated with the start of their
recent unemployment spells and the duration of the spells. Also
recorded is the individual's current labor market status. From this,
the duration and status (censored or uncensored) of unemployment
spells can be computed. The PSID also allows for the identification
of whether a spell of unemployment ends in a new job or in recall.
The use of retrospective surveys introduces the possibility of
error in reported durations resulting from discreteness of responses
4This discussion ignores the CPS rotation group bias. The problems
with the point-in-time technique are discussed in more detai in Kaitz
(1970], Marston (1975] and Salant [1977]. See also Kiefer, Lundberg
and Neumann [1984].
- 106 -
to survey questions. It is easy to imagine individuals reporting
that their unemployment spells lasted 1/2 or 3/4 of the previous
year. This discreteness has non-trivial consequences since one
important finding from studies using retrospective surveys is that
the hazard rate of exit from unemployment increases sharply at 26 and
39 weeks. A number of researchers have noted that this increase in
the hazard rate coincides with the typical exhaustion points of state
unemployment insurance benefits. Unfortunately, whether benefit
exhaustion is causal or whether individuals are simply reporting
durations in fractions of a year is difficult to determine given
retrospective data.
A different type of data drawn from state unemployment agency
administrative records is employed by Moffitt [1985) and Meyer
[1987]. These data have the advantage of providing continuous
sampling of individual unemployment spells on a weekly basis and
therefore provide a more accurate depiction of the length of spells
than either the CPS or the PSID data. Unlike the PSID, the
administrative record data contain information on the amount of
unemployment insurance benefits that an individual receives. By
their very nature, however, administrative records are available only
for those individuals who receive unemployment insurance benefits.
Given the high fraction of the unemployed who do not receive
benefits, such a sample is clearly not representative of the
population of unemployed individuals. Furthermore, administrative
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records typically cannot be used to determine whether exit from
unemployment is via recall or a new job. Katz's study of PSID spells
suggests that this is an essential piece of information for
attempting to understand the nature of unemployment durations.
The SIP? provides information which addresses many of the
problems associated with existing duration data. For one, the SIPP
provides a unique opportunity to examine a large, representative
sample of the working population. This includes both individuals who
receive and those who do not receive unemployment insurance benefits.
The data also support an examination of the influence of UI benefit
levels and the importance of layoff versus recall as a form of exit.
While the UI benefit data are survey values and therefore less
precise than values obtained from administrative records, the
presence of employer information in the SIPP allows one to examine
benefits in the context of a competing risks framework. This type of
analysis cannot be undertaken with standard administrative records.
Conversely, while the PSID allows for the identification of
individuals who find new jobs, it cannot readily be used to examine
the impact of UI benefit levels.
The survey design also facilitates the study of unemployment
durations by providing weekly data on employment status. The SIP?
employs a continuous monitoring technique in which individuals are
asked to report on their labor market status in each week of the
preceeding four months. Since individuals are asked to report on
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their status for each week, the point-in-time spell observation
problems associated with the CPS do not exist. The combination of a
relatively short four-month interview period and continuous
monitoring should make the data less prone to rounding error of the
type expected in yearly surveys like the PSID.
Central to the current analysis is the calculation of spells of
unemployment. Spells for individuals in the SIPP are calculated in a
straightforward fashion. When a week of paid work is followed by
either a week without a job or a week with a job but without pay, an
unemployment spell is said to have begun. At the time the spell
begins, relevant economic and demographic data are recorded; thus the
covariates used in this paper are start of spell values. For
example, the asset income data is the monthly receipt of asset or
property income prior to spell onset. Also recorded at the start of
the spell is the SIPP employer code.
Individuals are followed from week to week across waves for the
duration of the spell or until the end of the fourth wave. A spell
is completed when the individual reports being with a job and
receiving pay during a given week. No attempt is made separately to
allow for spell termination via exit from the labor force. Censored
spells are marked accordingly. For individuals with completed
spells, the employer identifier at the new job is compared with the
original employer identifiers; non-matching observations are recorded
- 109 -
as new job exits.5
3. Results
3.1 Descriptive Results
As noted previously, the recorded covariates in the SIPP data
used in this study are start of spell values. Conceptually, the
covariates analyzed in this paper can be divided into three classes:
heterogeneity controls, income variables, and industry and occupation
classification variables. The heterogeneity controls are standard
individual characteristics such as age and level of education. Also
included are indicator variables for being female, non-white and
married. The industry and occupation class variables are based upon
1980 Census of Occupation and Industrial Classification groupings,
and are included to control for differences in labor market
structures and opportunities. Frequencies for the industrial and
occupation classes are presented in table 1.
Two types of income variables are used. The first type is
related to the amount of asset income that the family receives. If
the search model interpretation of unemployment is correct,
individuals with high asset income values would be expected to have
5This is essentially the same technique used by Katz in his PSID
study. A more detailed classification should be possible with the
availability of the SIPP work history supplement. Tenure information
available in the supplement can be used to check the consistency of
responses.
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Table 1 - Industry and occupation classification frequencies for the
SIPP sample of unemployment spells, 1980 Census of Industry and
Occupation Classification System.
Occupation Number Frequency
Professional 566 13.40%
Sales 838 19.84%
Service 676 16.00%
Craft 888 21.02%
Laborer 1256 29.73%
Total 4224 100.00%
Industry Number Frequency
Agriculture 18 0.43%
Mining 47 1.11%
Construction 634 15.01%
Durables 408 9.66%
Non-durables 707 16.74%
Transportation 370 8.76%
Wholesale Durables 63 1.49%
Wholesale Non-durables 584 13.83%
Services 1363 32.27%
Other 30 0.71%
Total 4224 100.00%
Note: Based upon author's calculations from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation.
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longer durations since the marginal value of foregone earned income
will be high for an individual with no other income sources. The
other class of income variable relates to the receipt of UI. Three
proxies for UI are used in estimation: an indicator variable for
receipt of benefits, a measure of the UI replacement rate which
compares UI benefit levels to previous earned income, and UI benefit
levels themselves.
In table 2, I present descriptive statistics for the sample of
4,224 unemployment spells. The mean value of duration is presented
without correction for right censoring. Furthermore, the UI figures
reported in the table do not correct for the large number of
individuals who do not receive UI benefits.6 While the receipt of UI
benefits has been a focal point of interest in unemployment
durations, often overlooked is the fact that there are large numbers
of individuals do not receive UI benefits; in the SIPP data, over 75
percent of the spells involve no receipt. Whether the lack of
benefit receipt occurs because individuals do not qualify or because
the majority of spells are so short that applying for and receiving
benefits is not worth the effort is a question for which the answer
6The appropriate technique for correcting mean values for censoring
is a subject of some debate (Marston (1975J). Since longer spells
are more likely to be censored than short, a correction would merely
accentuate the differences between mean values. For the full 4,224
spell sample, the mean values conditional upon receipt are $177.97
for benefits and 0.327 for the replacement rate. The standard
deviations are 113.43 and 0.472 respectively.
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Table 2 - Mean values for covariates in the SIP? sample of
unemployment spells, broken down by type of exit.
Overall Recall New Job
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Duration 10.45 14.32 5.78 8.22 10.57 9.57
Heterogenei ty Controls
Age 41.76 14.42 40.48 13.63 34.22 10.46
Education 12.11 2.91 12.16 2.87 12.88 2.57
Female 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
Married 0.59 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.52 0.50
Non-white 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.07 0.25
# of children 0.85 1.17 0.86 1.16 0.91 1.38
Income Variables
Asset Income $ 68.88 270.09 65.60 264.11 40.50 120.75
UI Receipt 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43
UI Replacement 0.06 1.18 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.30
UI Benefits $ 34.63 86.41 34.08 84.03 49.05 97.66
N 4224 3127 152
Note: Based upon author's calculations from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation.
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is not known and one which deserves further study.7
The most obvious feature of the mean values in table 2 is the
difference between mean duration for spells ending in recall and the
mean duration for those ending in a new job. While the sample is
predominantly made up of short recall spells, the combination of the
relatively lengthy new job and censored durations is enough to raise
the overall mean to a figure in excess of two months. This is
comparable to the average for new job spells and almost twice as
great as that for recall. The figures in table 2 also suggest that
new job spells are associated with younger, more educated
individuals. There is nothing surprising about this relationship
since job mobility is typically associated with those
characteristics.8
7
An additional possibility is that there are delays between the onset
of unemployment spells and the receipt of benefits so that the actual
receipt of benefits is missed. Baily [1978], for one, points out
that benefits are not typically paid for the first week of
unemployment. Thus, for a sample with an extremely large number of
short spells, a large number of spells may appear to have no benefits
associated with them. It is unlikely tht this effect accounts for
the bulk of non-recipients. As one piece of evidence, note that the
large proportion of non-recipients holds whether actual receipt of
benefits or self-reported eligibility is used. The latter meausre
should be less sensitive to timing considerations.
8While I do not report the standard errors of the means, they are
small enough so that the comparisons are valid. For example, the
standard error of the mean age for spells ending in a new job is
0.849; for education, the corresponding figure is 0.208. The
standard errors are even smaller for the much larger sample of spells
ending in recall.
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In table 3 I present the calculated durations for the sample.
Bear in mind that the 4,224 exit times include multiple observations
on individuals. These durations are broken down by mode of exit,
whether via a new job or recall to a previous employer. The
censoring category refers to the right censored observations for whom
spells were continuing at the conclusion of the sample. The same
information is presented in table 4 for a subsample formed by taking
the observation on the longest spell for each of the 2,282
individuals. If individuals are more likely to report longer spells,
this is the type of sample that might be observed upon asking
individuals retrospectively to report on their recent unemployment
experience.
There is evidence that even the weekly data in the SIPP
generates some discreteness in calculated durations. In table 3, the
number of censored observations is noticeably elevated around 52
weeks and to a lesser degree, around 39 and 26 weeks. Since these
figures are for censored observations, they result presumably not
from discrete responses on the part of individuals, but because of
the four-months per wave sample design of the SIPP. Significantly,
however, there is no elevation of either the recall or the new job
figures at the 52 week point so that discretness in censoring does
not appear to be mirrored in the other exit modes.
One striking feature of the exit types in table 3 is the
relatively small number of new job exits. Katz observed
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Table 3 - Calculated durations of unemployment spells for the SIP?
sample, broken down by mode of exit. Sample of 4,224 spells.
Risk Set Total Non-Censored
4224
3071
2487
2162
1916
1752
1634
1512
1426
1332
1260
1194
1133
1060
1010
947
931
807
692
680
656
636
599
578
564
546
521
509
487
469
462
448
435
428
407
336
327
320
313
295
1153
584
325
246
164
118
122
86
94
72
66
61
73
50
63
16
124
115
12
24
20
37
21
14
18
25
12
22
18
7
14
13
7
21
71
9
7
7
18
14
1116
545
294
216
141
99
92
68
72
58
50
46
51
35
54
14
63
35
6
18
12
22
15
8
9
14
6
10
10
4
6
9
3
13
12
2
4
1
5
6
Recall New Job Censored
1101
536
284
201
130
92
85
62
65
53
43
40
46
34
48
12
57
30
5
16
11
20
13
8
7
13
5
9
8
4
5
8
2
12
12
2
4
1
5
6
Week
- 116 -
Table 3 - (continued)
Week Risk Set Total Non-Censored
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
281
277
268
263
253
248
240
237
227
223
216
211
123
66
59
54
48
44
39
36
32
25
24
23
17
13
11
7
3
Totals
4
9
5
10
5
8
3
10
4
7
5
88
57
7
5
6
4
5
3
4
7
1
1
6
4
2
4
4
3
4224
1
5
2
4
2
1
1
3
1
2
3
1
2
2
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
3229
Note: Based upon author's calculations
and Program Participation.
Recall New Job Censored
1
4
2
4
1
1
1
3
1
2
3
1
2
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
3127
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
152
3
4
3
6
3
7
2
7
3
5
2
87
55
5
4
5
4
4
3
4
7
1
1
4
4
2
4
4
3
945
from the Survey of Income
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approximately twice as many new job findings in a sample a quarter of
this size. One possible explanation for the difference lies in the
high concentration of non-whites and industrial workers and
under-representation of other groups in his PSID sample. For
example, approximately 17 percent of the PSID sample is comprised of
individuals in construction, a much smaller figure than the
corresponding 32 percent in the SIPP shown in table 1. Similarly,
laborers account for 50 percent of the PSID and professionals less
than 4 percent. The figures for the SIPP are 30 and 13 respectively.
Given the presumption that job change rates differ by industry and
occupation, then the sampling differences between the two studies
might account for the discrepancy in relative magnitudes.9
Also of note in table 3 are the large number of short duration
spells. For the full sample, almost half of spells are observed to
end in the first month, with 2,171 recalls or new jobs occurring
during that period. By the end of the fourth month, the risk set has
been reduced to 947. While this figure does not correct for the
censored failures over the four month interval, that does not change
the basic result that most spells are of very short duration.
The existence of this type of employment instability relates
9It may also be that the algorithm used here to determine whether the
individual returns to the old job or finds a new one misses some job
changes. Alternatively, surveys employing retrospective questioning
may miss spells of short duration that end by recall because
individuals do not bother to report them.
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Table 4 - Calculated durations of unemployment spells for the SIPP
sample, broken down by mode of exit. Subsample of 2282 spells.
Week Risk Set Total Non-Censored Recall New Job Censored
1 2282 470 456 450 6 14
2 1812 286 274 272 2 12
3 1526 177 166 163 3 11
4 1349 132 119 115 4 13
5 1217 87 76 73 3 11
6 1130 62 56 53 3 6
7 1068 72 56 54 2 16
8 996 48 38 38 0 10
9 948 54 42 38 4 12
10 894 43 34 32 2 9
11 851 39 32 29 3 7
12 812 40 30 26 4 10
13 772 44 33 31 2 11
14 728 21 17 17 0 4
15 707 41 34 32 2 7
16 666 10 9 9 0 1
17 656 87 49 45 4 38
18 569 74 25 22 3 49
19 495 6 3 3 0 3
20 489 16 13 12 1 3
21 473 15 9 8 1 6
22 458 24 15 13 2 9
23 434 9 6 6 0 3
24 425 10 6 6 0 4
25 415 11 4 4 0 7
26 404 17 9 8 1 8
27 387 9 6 5 1 3
28 378 11 6 6 0 5
29 367 11 7 5 2 4
30 356 6 3 3 0 3
31 350 8 3 2 1 5
32 342 9 6 6 0 3
33 333 3 1 1 0 2
34 330 20 12 11 1 8
35 310 48 8 8 0 40
36 262 7 2 2 0 5
37 255 5 3 3 0 2
38 250 4 1 1 0 3
39 246 16 4 4 0 12
40 230 10 5 5 0 5
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Table 4 -
Week
(continued)
Risk Set Total Non-Censored Recall New Job Censored
3
4
1
4
1
6
2
7
2
4
2
71
41
1
3
4
1
3
3
4
5
1
3
3
1
4
4
3
4
9
2
7
2
7
3
10
3
5
5
72
42
2
4
5
1
4
3
4
5
1
3
5
1
4
4
3
2282
Note: Based upon author's
and Program Participation.
calculations from the Survey of Income
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
220
216
207
205
198
196
189
186
176
173
168
163
91
49
47
43
38
37
33
30
26
21
20
17
12
11
7
3
1
5
1
3
1
1
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
07
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1707
1
4
1
3
1
1
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1648 59 575Totals
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back to earlier questions about the nature of unemployment; whether
unemployment is the result of chronic unemployment spells or frequent
short spells. Along these lines, the difference in the numbers of
spells represented by the two samples in tables 3 and 4 deserves some
comment. The totals imply that individuals in the SIPP who reported
spells of unemployment had an average of close to two spells. The
distribution of numbers of spells is presented in table 5. While the
majority of individuals experienced just one spell, fully 40 percent
of had multiple spells in the 16 month period, with over 20 percent
experiencing three or more spells. This large proportion of the
sample with multiple spells indicates that despite the relatively
high exit rate from unemployment in the first few weeks of a given
spell, individuals may be experiencing relatively lengthy aggregate
spells of unemployment over any given period of time.
Associated with the distribution of exit times given in tables 3
and 4 are hazard rates for exit from unemployment. These hazards are
calculated by taking the number of exits of a given type at a given
period and dividing by the risk set of individuals who have not yet
exited prior to the start of the period. Monthly hazards for the
full sample are presented in figures 1 and 2 for both exit via recall
and exit via new job. The recall hazard has the characteristic
downward slope found in most empirical hazards. There are small
spikes in the hazard at 5 months and at 9 months. The latter spike
is the familiar one associated with 36 weeks and may be related to
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Table 5 - Frequency distribution for the number of spells per
individual in the SIPP unemployment data set.
Number Count Percent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1625
602
246
137
79
45
21
18
12
1
1
1
58.29%
21.59%
8.82%
4.91%
2.83%
1.61%
0.75%
0.65%
0.43%
0.04%
0.04%
0.04%
Total 2788 100.00%
Note: This table was calculated from a slightly different sample
than that used in estimation. Based upon author's calculations from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
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Figure 1 - Recall Hazard for Exit from Unemployment
Full 4,224 Spell Sample
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Figure 2 - New Job Hazard for Exit from Unemployment
Full 4,224 Spell Sample
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the exhaustion of UI benefits. The former seems to be centered
around 18 weeks. Conspicuously missing is the spike at 26 weeks.
The empirical hazard rate for new job finding is difficult to
characterize. The hazard slopes upward for the first four months
then declines througout the remaining months. Spikes are present at
several periods, but given the relatively small sample sizes, should
not be given too much weight. The downard slope is in contrast to
Katz's PSID findings of an increasing hazard throughout and is
inconsistent with the standard search theory models of unemployment.
It may be that the differences in empirical hazards are the result of
differences in sample selection criteria used in the two studies.
Thus, differences in the hazard might result from differences in the
observable characteristics of individuals in the two data sources.
The hazard models estimated below are designed to account for this
individual heterogeneity.
There are two possible interpretations of the absence of the 26
week spike. The first argues that the spike is merely an artifact of
the discreteness of the data used in previous studies and that the
continuous monitoring of the SIPP eliminates the lumpiness problem.
This view seems unlikely in light of evidence from weekly
administrative records suggesting that hazard rates increase in the
weeks prior to benefit exhaustion (Meyer [1987)). A more plausible
explanation is that these data cover a period of time in which
Federal Supplemental Benefits extended eligibility to 39 weeks for
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most individuals. This explanation is consistent with the strong
effect at the relevant months. There is evidence from the Continuous
Wage and Benefit History for 1981 which indicates that potential UI
benefits are considerably more likely to end at 39 weeks (Katz
(1985]).
The presence of a spike at 18 weeks is considerably more
difficult to explain. One possibility is that the 26 and 39 week
exhaustion points do not apply to these individuals. In addition to
limitations on the maximum number of weeks of benefits, a number of
states impose ceilings on the maximum potential benefits paid. It is
possible that these benefit ceilings yielded exhaustion of benefits
at weeks prior to 26. While it is impossible, given the SIPP data,
to determine when the actual exhaustion points are, it is interesting
to note that of those states with potential benefits durations that
vary with work history, a number have minimum potential durations in
the neighborhood of 18 weeks.10 Nevertheless, the magnitude of the
18 week spike is a puzzle.
In figures 3 and 4 I graph the corresponding sample hazards for
the subsample. While there are differences between these and the
full sample results, the two sets of hazards are mostly characterized
10For 1986, the only year for which data are available, 44 states
have potential benefit durations which varied depending upon the
individual work history. There were 9 states with minimum durations
of 12 weeks, 3 with 13 weeks, 2 with 14 weeks, and 13 from 15-20
weeks.
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Figure 3 - Recall Hazard for Exit from Unemployment
Subsample of 2,282 Spells
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Figure 4 - New Job Hazard for Exit from Unemployment
Subsomple of 2,282 Spells
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by their similarities. In particular, the downward slope of both the
recall and the latter portion of the new job hazard exists for the
subsample. It is worth noting that the new job hazard exhibits more
variability because of the very small sample size involved.
3.2 Single Risk Models
The models estimated in this chapter are based upon the Cox
[1972] proportional hazards framework. Hazard, or duration, models
have been used to study a variety of economic phenomena in which a
single event occurs once over time. In essence, these models are
reduced form specifications for conditional probabilities of an event
occurring. Because of the obvious application to the study of
unemployment durations, a number of researchers have, in recent
years, applied these techniques to the study of unemployment spells.
The estimation of the hazard rates in this and the following
section is based upon the semi-parametric techniques described in
greater detail in Han and Hausman and in chapters 1 and 3 of this
thesis. The actual models estimated were of the ordered logit form
with the categories of the logit corresponding to the week of exit
from unemployment or censoring. The model was estimated for 40 weeks
because of relatively small numbers of exits beyond that point.
Observations with durations greater than 40 weeks are censored at
that point.
Estimation is performed using maximum likelihood techniques. I
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use a modified version of the algorithm described by Berndt, Hall,
Hall and Hausman [1974). Since the ordered logit form of the model
implies global concavity of the likelihood function (Pratt (1981]),
it is not surprising that convergence for the models was rapid, even
for the models with large numbers of parameters.
Results for the single risk models are presented in tables 6 and
7. Table 6 contains parameter estimates for two models with basic
heterogeneity controls. In the first model, the effect of UI is
represented by an indicator for whether benefits are received; in the
latter, a measure of the fraction of previous earnings that UI
benefits represents, or the UI replacement rate, is used. The
results are similar across the specifications. The coefficients for
age, the non-white indicator, and the number of children under 18 in
the family have precisely estimated negative coefficients, implying
that individuals with those characteristics have relatively low exit
hazards. Married individuals have higher hazards as do individuals
with more education, though the coefficient for the latter variable
is imprecisely measured. Income from assets reduces the hazard in
both specifications, but the effect is not statistically different
from zero.
For the basic specification, the extra information provided by
incorporating benefit levels into the analysis appears to be
important. The model using UI replacement rates fits the data better
than the model using an indicator of benefit receipt, improving the
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Table 6 - Single risk estimation for unemployment exit, basic
heterogeneity controls models.
Heterogenei ty Controls
Age
Education
Female
(1=yes)
Married
(1=yes)
Non-White
(1=yes)
Number of Children
Under 18
Income Variables
Assets Income
(S1000s per month)
UI Receipt
Indicator (1=yes)
UI Replacement
Rate
Log Likelihood -9803.22 -9788.87
Note: N = 4,224. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
-0.0163
(0.0013)
0.0005
(0.0065)
-0.0461
(0.0440)
0.0969
(0.0438)
-0.1295
(0.0513)
-0.0427
(0.0169)
-0.0170
(0.0012)
-0.0064
(0.0064)
-0.0574
(0.0434)
0.1011
(0.0434)
-0.1327
(0.0512)
-0.0410
(0.0168)
-0.0569
(0.0729)
0.0134
(0.0454)
-0.0629
(0.0730)
-0.4222
(0.0928)
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log likelihood by 15 from -9803.22 to -9788.87. Moreover, the
coefficient for replacement rates has the expected sign, with
benefits reducing the hazard, and is precisely measured. This result
is in contrast to the positive, but insignificant coefficient for the
receipt indicator.
To account for differences in spell durations resulting from
variation across industries and occupations, I estimate a more
general model incorporating dummy variables for industry and
occupation class. The results are given in table 7. The base groups
for the estimation are laborers and agriculture. The inclusion of
classification variables improves the fit of the models
substantially. Log-likelihood ratio tests for these models yield
test statistic values of 84 and 96 respectively, both of which are
statistically significant at the 5% level for 12 degrees of freedom.
The occupation indicators seem to be the more important of the two
groups of variables, with all of the occupation classes having low
hazards relative to laborers. The lower hazards are surprising if
one views unemployment as being a single spell phenomenon since one
might think that, say, professionals would find jobs more readily
available than laborers giving them a higher hazard. They are less
puzzling if laborers are viewed as moving into and out of employment
with some frequency so that over a given period the same aggregate
unemployment duration is associated with a greater number of spells.
In contrast to the result in the basic model, the parameter for
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Table 7 - Single risk estimation for unemployment exit hazards, full
industry and occupation classification controls models.
Heterogeneity Controls
Age
Education
Female
(1=yes)
Married
(1=yes)
Non-White
(1=yes)
Number of
Under 18
Children
-0.0155
(0.0013)
0.0188
(0.0072)
0.0745
(0.0486)
0.0987
(0.0438)
-0.1307
(0.0522)
-0.0481
(0.0170)
-0.0161
(0.0013)
0.0177
(0.0071)
0.0760
(0.0484)
0.1015
(0.0435)
-0.1334
(0.0520)
-0.0476
(0.0169)
-0.0170
(0.0013)
0.0192
(0.0071)
0.0507
(0.0483)
0.1076
(0.0435)
-0.1332
(0.0516)
-0.0427
(0.0167)
Income Variables
Assets Income
($1000s per month)
UI Receipt
Indicator (1=yes)
UI Replacement
Rate
UI Benefit bevel
(100$ per week)
-0.4963
(0.0925)
-0.2248
(0.0266)
-0.0368
(0.0762)
-0.0556
(0.0467)
-0.0419
(0.0761)
-0.0316
(0.0749)
Table 7 (continued)
Occupation Classification
Professional
Sales
Service
Craft
Industry Classification
Mining
Construction
Durables
Non-durables
Transportation
Wholesale
Durables
Wholesale
Non-durables
Service
Industries
Log Likelihood
Note: N = 4,224. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
- 133 -
-0.4041
(0.0777)
-0.2561
(0.0630)
-0.2336
(0.0688)
-0.0398
(0.0528)
-0.1765
(0.2672)
0.1759
(0.1909)
-0.0482
(0.1910)
0.1161
(0.1881)
-0.0356
(0.1930)
-0.0570
(0.2288)
-0.1190
(0.1878)
0.0844
(0.1835)
-9761.14
-0.4148
(0.0774)
-0.2610
(0.0629)
-0.2403
(0.0682)
-0.0538
(0.0530)
-0.1329
(0.2609)
0.2072
(0.1897)
-0.0371
(0.1898)
0.1274
(0.1868)
-0.0234
(0.1920)
-0.0452
(0.2276)
-0.1190
(0.1866)
0.0869
(0.1824)
-9742.70
-0.4302
(0.0764)
-0.2809
(0.0617)
-0.2618
(0.0669)
-0.0597
(0.0530)
-0.0312
(0.2556)
0.2780
(0.1886)
-0.0032
(0.1886)
0.2049
(0.1856)
0.0081
(0.1910)
-0.0417
(0.2256)
-0.1067
(0.1856)
0.1057
(0.1814)
-9696.65
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education is now precisely measured, with additional years of
schooling increasing the hazard rate. It is not surprising that
controlling for occupation and industry has an effect on the
education variable since the correlation between education and
industry and occupation is usually quite high. The coefficient for
UI in the first specification switches sign so that benefit receipt
is associated with lower hazards, but is still statistically
insignificant. A higher replacement rate continues to reduce exit
probabilities.
Because of some concern over the accuracy of the replacement
rate variable, I specify a third model that incorporates directly UI
benefit levels. The results are presented in the third column of
tables 6 and the second column of table 7. Interestingly, the model
fits the data slightly better, though the results for the other
variables are similar to the results obtained when the replacement
rate is employed.
Since the sample of 4,224 observations represents an unbalanced
panel with multiple observations on individuals, the presence of
individual specific random effects would yield inconsistent parameter
estimates. As a crude indicator of the sensitivity of the model to
the inclusion of multiple spells, I reestimated the models given in
tables 6 and 7 for the subsample containing one observation for each
individual. The results of estimation for this sample are presented
in tables 8 and 9.
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Table 8 - Single risk estimation for unemployment exit hazards, full
industry and occupation classification controls models. Subsample
of spells.
Heterogenei ty Controls
Age
Education
Female
(1=yes)
Married
(1=yes)
Non-White
Number of
Children under 18
Income Variables
Asset Income
($1000s per month)
UI Replacement
Rate
UI Benefits
($100 per week)
Log Likelihood -5349.18 -5344.70
Note: N = 2,282. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
-0.0161
(0.0017)
-0.0058
(0.0085)
-0.0727
(0.0599)
0.0694
(0.0592)
-0.2412
(0.0682)
-0.0498
(0.0226)
-0.1192
(0.0994)
-0.0417
(0.0617)
-0.0165
(0.0017)
-0.0074
(0.0084)
-0.0755
(0.0592)
0.0670
(0.0590)
-0.2421
(0.0680)
-0.0497
(0.0225)
-0.1225
(0.0989)
-0.3100
(0.1135)
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Table 9 - Single risk estimation for unemployment exit hazards, full
industry and occupation classification controls models. Subsample
of spells.
Heterogenei ty Controls
Age
Education
Female
Married
Non-White
Number of
Children under 18
Income Variables
Asset Income
($1000 per month)
UI Replacement
Rate
UI Benefits
($100 per week)
-0.0148
(0.0018)
0.0102
(0.0097)
0.0457
(0.0679)
0.0934
(0.0595)
-0.2112
(0.0693)
-0.0511
(0.0227)
-0.0951
(0.1047)
-0.1134
(0.0639)
-0.0151
(0.0018)
0.0092
(0.0097)
0.0480
(0.0676)
0.0896
(0.0593)
-0.2118
(0.0691)
-0.0523
(0.0226)
-0.0987
(0.1045)
-0.3680
(0.1140)
Table 9 - (continued)
Occupation Classification
Professional
Sales
Service
Craft
Industry Classification
Mining
Construction
Durables
Non-durables
Transportation
Wholesale
Durables
Wholesale
Non-durables
Service
Log Likelihood
Note: N = 2,282. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
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-0.3288
(0.1064)
-0.1425
(0.0882)
-0.1553
(0.0962)
0.0126
(0.0740)
-0.3268
(0.1061)
-0.1392
(0.0884)
-0.1448
(0.0959)
0.0108
(0.0740)
-0.1282
(0.3510)
0.2910
(0.2661)
-0.1666
(0.2680)
0.1568
(0.2615)
-0.0977
(0.2695)
-0.1921
(0.3293)
-0.0590
(0.2603)
0.0952
(0.2532)
-0.0729
(0.3452)
0.3038
(0.2669)
-0.1508
(0.2690)
0.1709
(0.2625)
-0.0743
(0.2706)
-0.1873
(0.3297)
-0.0518
(0.2613)
0.1032
(0.2542)
-5322.29 -5317.73
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The results for the subsample are quite similar to those for the
full sample. Comparing, for example the results for the benefit
specification in column 3 of tables 7 and 9, only minor differences
are observed in the heterogeneity control variables. The influence
of UI benefits is somewhat larger in the subsample (0.3680 versus
0.2248), but so too is the standard error. Similarly, the industry
and occupation results differ by amounts that are within the realm of
sampling error. While this does not rigorously prove that individual
effects are not likely to be a problem, it does suggest that the
conclusions are unlikely to be altered by considering the more
general model.
Taken together, the results from the single risk models indicate
that UI receipt has an important effect upon unemployment exit rates.
UI is also important relative to demographic characteristics. For
example, in the full industry and occupation control model with UI
replacement rates (column 2 of table 7), a change in the rate of ten
basis points, from say .40 to .50, has an impact almost four times as
large as the effect of being non-white. Similarly, the indicator for
receipt of benefits (column 1 of table 7) has about the same impact
as two to three fewer years of education, while an extra $10 a week
in UI benefits has is equivalent to being two years older in reducing
hazards. Furthermore, $10 additional dollars of weekly UI benefits
has about the same impact as receiving an additional $1000 in assets
income per month, suggesting that the direct relationship between
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employment status and the receipt of benefits is important.
To get a better sense of the impact that these values have on
the hazard rates, I calculate elasticities of the hazard at the mean
values for the data. Given the proportional hazard specification,
the elasticity takes a particularly convenient form. Recalling that
the hazard function is of the form A(tjX,p) = A,(t) exp(Xp), it
follows that
aA(t|X,p) Xk A0 (t) exp(Xp) XkPk
17k = = Xk~k'
aXk A(tjX,p) A0 (t) exp(Xp)
The elasticities corresponding to the models in table 7 are given in
table 10. The elasticities for UI replacement rate and benefit
levels are relatively significant, exceeding in magnitude all
variables with the exception of age. According to these figures, an
increase in the benefit level of 10 percent per week would uniformly
increase the hazard rate by about 2.3 percent.
3.3 Competing Risks Models
To account for the the fact that individuals may exit from
unemployment by finding a new job or by being recalled to their
previous one, I estimate competing risks models of unemployment
duration. The basic framework is set forth elsewhere in this thesis.
Since, under the assumption that the hazard rates conditional upon
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Table 10 - Elasticities of covariates evaluated at means for single
risk model with full industry and occupation controls. Full sample
of spells.
Heterogenei ty Controls
Age
Education
Female
(1=yes)
Married
(1=yes)
Non-White
(1=yes)
Number of Children
Under 18
Income Variables
Assets Income
($1000s per month)
UI Receipt
(1=yes)
UI Replacement Rate
0.6473
(0.0543)
-0.2277
(0.0872)
-0.0246
(0.0160)
-0.0582
(0.0258)
0.0183
(0.0073)
0.0409
(0.0145)
0.0025
(0.0052)
0.0122
(0.0103)
0.6723
(0.0543)
-0.2143
(0.0860)
-0.0251
(0.0160)
-0.0599
(0.0257)
0.0187
(0.0073)
0.0405
(0.0144)
0.0029
(0.0052)
0.7099
(0.0543)
-0.2325
(0.0860)
-0.0167
(0.0159)
-0.0635
(0.0257)
0.0186
(0.0072)
0.0363
(0.0142)
0.0022
(0.0052)
0.2652
(0.0314)
UI Benefits
($100s per week)
0.2343
(0.0437)
Note: The mean values for replacement rate and benefits are
conditional upon receipt. Mean values for the other covariates are
taken from the first column of table 2.
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individual characteristics are independent, the likelihood function
factors into separate components for each risk (Kalbfleisch and
Prentice [1980]), the analysis involves maximum likelihood estimation
of two separate ordered logit models in which first one and then the
other of the failure types is treated as a censored failure.
Competing risks models are not estimated for the individual subsample
due to the exceedingly small cell sizes associated with the new job
failure type. Preliminary attempts at estimating a competing risks
model with a general error structure failed to achieve convergence.
The results for two competing risks specifications are presented
in table 11. Furthermore, the model using UI benefit levels fits the
data better than the corresponding replacement rate model, with an
improvement in the log likelihood of the sample from -9360.72 to
-9318.26 for the recall hazard and from -903.755 to -901.601 for the
new job hazard. Once again, the results are essentially the same
whether UI is represented by the replacement rate or by benefit
levels.
Differences between the coefficients across risks illustrate the
need to account for the competing risks nature of the exit from
unemployment. The most significant differences between the relative
effects of covariates are for the heterogeneity controls. Age,
education, and non-white all have larger relative effects upon the
new job hazard than upon the recall hazard; the age and education
coefficients are three times as large as, and the coefficient for the
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Table 11 - Competing risks estimation for unemployment exit hazards,
full industry and occupation classification controls models. Full
sample of spells.
Variables Recall New Job Recall New Job
Heterogenei ty Controls
Age
Education
Female
(1=yes)
Married
(1=yes)
Non-White
(1=yes)
Number of
Under 18
Children
-0.0146 -0.0464 -0.0155 -0.0474
(0.0013) (0.0092) (0.0013) (0.0092)
0.0143 0.1044 0.0159 0.1000
(0.0073) (0.0396) (0.0072) (0.0397)
0.0988 -0.3570 0.0731 -0.3822
(0.0498) (0.2452) (0.0497) (0.2462)
0.1213 -0.2201 0.1275 -0.1990
(0.0446) (0.2222) (0.0446) (0.2223)
-0.0962 -1.1129 -0.0955 -1.1042
(0.0528) (0.4212) (0.0525) (0.4206)
-0.0494 0.0423 -0.0448 0.0402
(0.0170) (0.0916) (0.0168) (0.0917)
Assets Income
(S1000s per month)
UI Replacement
Rate
UI Benefit Level
(100$ per week)
-0.0291 -0.5348 -0.0197 -0.5094
(0.0779) (0.7355) (0.0765) (0.7491)
-0.5249 -0.0605 ----- -----
(0.0929) (0.3409)
----- ------ -0.2279 -0.1720
(0.0270) (0.1254)
Income Variables
Table 11 - (continued)
Occupation Classification
Professional
Sales
Service
Craft
Industry Classification
Mining
Construction
Durables
Non-durables
Transportation
Wholesale
Durables
Wholesale
Non-durables
Service
Log Likelihood
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
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-0.4135
(0.0789)
-0.2865
(0.0644)
-0.2765
(0.0702)
-0.0731
(0.0540)
-0.1721
(0.2718)
0.1929
(0.1935)
-0.0485
(0.1936)
0.1254
(0.1903)
-0.0323
(0.1956)
-0.0396
(0.2334)
-0.1449
(0.1904)
0.0763
(0.1864)
-9360.72
-0.4496
(0.4289)
0.2640
(0.3496)
0.3779
(0.3983)
0.3894
(0.3296)
0.5520
(1.2064)
0.5207
(1.0893)
0.1900
(1.0824)
0.2356
(1.0711)
0.2627
(1.1009)
-0.1790
(1.3006)
0.4336
(1.0812)
0.4180
(1.0835)
-903.755
-0.4280
(0.0777)
-0.3049
(0.0632)
-0.2966
(0.0689)
-0.0780
(0.0539)
-0.0814
(0.2657)
0.2622
(0.1920)
-0.0134
(0.1921)
0.2016
(0.1889)
-0.0011
(0.1943)
-0.0311
(0.2312)
-0.1321
(0.1891)
0.0959
(0.1851)
-9318.26
-0.4586
(0.4284)
0.2441
(0.3486)
0.3566
(0.3982)
0.3772
(0.3292)
0.6710
(1.2004)
0.6421
(1.0914)
0.2234
(1.0837)
0.3327
(1.0734)
0.3194
(1.1028)
-0.1565
(1.2991)
0.4553
(1.0828)
0.4494
(1.0852)
-901.601
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non-white indicator is ten times greater than the corresponding
coefficients for the recall hazard. The sensitivity of the new job
hazard is consistent with the view that observable individual
characteristics are more important for an individual in finding a new
job than in being recalled. A similar result is observed for being
female, but the coefficients are not precisely estimated.
The coefficient for UI replacement is large and statistically
significant for recall but small and insignificant for the new job
risk. The coefficients for UI benefit levels are similar in
character. The finding that UI affects recall more than new job
finding is counterintuitive, since if anything, one would expect UI
to have a larger impact upon new job hazards than upon the
probability of being recalled. It may be that the small sample size
for new job individuals makes it difficult to estimate the impact of
benefit level variables with any precision. The small standard
errors with which the heterogeneity coefficients are estimated,
however, makes it difficult to support this argument.
Even if this is the case, the strong relationship between UI and
recall suggests that firms are taking advantage of the subsidy to
layoff provided by UI systems. If there were no firm response to the
UI system, then there should be no observable impact upon recall
hazards. If firm layoff and recall behavior are, in fact, affected
by UI, then standard models of unemployment duration are missing a
large part of the story underlying the effect of UI on unemployment
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spells.
There is a strong occupational component to the recall risk.
Each of the occupation classes exhibits a smaller risk of exit than
laborers with all but the craft classification statistically
significant. The largest differential is observed for professional
workers. In contrast, the occupational dummies for new job are
estimated with considerable error. The industry coefficients all
have relatively large standard errors.
The hazard estimates provide mixed support for the search
interpretation of unemployment durations. The baseline hazards for
the competing risks models are presented in tables 12 and 13 along
with the associated asymptotic standard errors. Weekly hazards for
the model using UI benefits are also depicted in figures 5 and 6.
The baseline hazard for recall is very similar to the empirical
hazard depicted earlier, with small spikes present at the same
places. More significantly, upon correcting for the presence of
observable heterogeneity and estimating the competing risk model, the
baseline hazard rate for new job finding appears to be upward
sloping, at least for the first few months. There are spikes in the
hazard just prior to 18, 26 and 39 weeks, a result that is consistent
with the view that UI exhaustion matters for job search.
The new job hazard for monthly exit times is presented in figure
7 for comparison with the weekly hazards and with the monthly
empirical hazard depicted earlier. The increase in the hazard for
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Table 12 - Estimated weekly baseline hazards for dual risk model of
unemployment spell duration, replacement rate specification.
Recall
Hazard Std ErrWeek
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
0.3981
0.2810
0.1905
0.1577
0.1171
0.0919
0.0914
0.0728
0.0811
0.0712
0.0615
0.0608
0.0738
0.0589
0.0871
0.0238
0.1127
0.0696
0.0137
0.0445
0.0318
0.0594
0.0415
0.0266
0.0239
0.0457
0.0186
0.0342
0.0320
0.0167
0.0212
0.0351
0.0092
0.0554
0.0583
0.0119
0.0244
0.0063
0.0323
0.0412
New Job
Hazard Std Err
0.0683
0.0537
0.0393
0.0337
0.0261
0.0215
0.0215
0.0180
0.0198
0.0179
0.0161
0.0161
0.0190
0.0161
0.0220
0.0085
0.0275
0.0194
0.0068
0.0147
0.0117
0.0182
0.0145
0.0110
0.0104
0.0159
0.0092
0.0135
0.0132
0.0091
0.0105
0.0146
0.0068
0.0196
0.0207
0.0088
0.0133
0.0065
0.0160
0.0190
0.0043
0.0036
0.0051
0.0090
0.0075
0.0053
0.0058
0.0055
0.0069
0.0053
0.0080
0.0074
0.0065
0.0014
0.0090
0.0034
0.0104
0.0099
0.0023
0.0048
0.0025
0.0051
0.0056
0.0000
0.0058
0.0032
0.0034
0.0034
0.0074
0.0000
0.0038
0.0041
0.0043
0.0044
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0054
0.0047
0.0065
0.0106
0.0095
0.0068
0.0075
0.0069
0.0085
0.0071
0.0102
0.0095
0.0087
0.0023
0.0121
0.0049
0.0131
0.0131
0.0037
0.0070
0.0045
0.0073
0.0080
0.0000
0.0082
0.0050
0.0056
0.0056
0.0103
0.0000
0.0061
0.0066
0.0070
0.0069
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
- 147 -
Table 13 - Estimated weekly baseline hazards for dual risk model of
unemployment spell duration, UI benefit specification.
Recal l
Hazard Std ErrWeek
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
0.4067
0.2904
0.1987
0.1656
0.1236
0.0972
0.0968
0.0772
0.0862
0.0758
0.0655
0.0648
0.0786
0.0627
0.0927
0.0252
0.1198
0.0743
0.0147
0.0476
0.0338
0.0633
0.0441
0.0283
0.0254
0.0487
0.0198
0.0364
0.0338
0.0177
0.0225
0.0372
0.0096
0.0586
0.0616
0.0125
0.0260
0.0066
0.0339
0.0435
New Job
Hazard Std Err
0.0688
0.0547
0.0405
0.0350
0.0273
0.0226
0.0226
0.0189
0.0209
0.0189
0.0170
0.0170
0.0201
0.0170
0.0232
0.0090
0.0290
0.0205
0.0073
0.0155
0.0125
0.0193
0.0153
0.0117
0.0110
0.0168
0.0098
0.0143
0.0139
0.0096
0.0112
0.0153
0.0070
0.0206
0.0218
0.0093
0.0141
0.0068
0.0169
0.0200
0.0047
0.0040
0.0057
0.0101
0.0086
0.0061
0.0067
0.0063
0.0079
0.0061
0.0092
0.0085
0.0076
0.0016
0.0105
0.0038
0.0119
0.0116
0.0027
0.0055
0.0028
0.0058
0.0063
0.0000
0.0067
0.0037
0.0039
0.0040
0.0084
0.0000
0.0044
0.0047
0.0049
0.0050
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0059
0.0052
0.0073
0.0120
0.0109
0.0078
0.0087
0.0080
0.0099
0.0082
0.0118
0.0109
0.0101
0.0027
0.0141
0.0056
0.0149
0.0152
0.0043
0.0081
0.0052
0.0084
0.0091
0.0000
0.0094
0.0057
0.0063
0.0066
0.0118
0.0000
0.0069
0.0075
0.0080
0.0080
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
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Figure 5 - Estimated Weekly Recall Hazard
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Figure 6 - Estimated Weekly New Job Hazard
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the first few months is again apparent, as is the sharp decline in
the subsequent months.
One really should be cautioned against drawing strong
conclusions from the new job hazard shapes since, given the large
standard errors in tables 12 and 13, figures 6 and 7 are consistent
with virtually any shape. Nevertheless based upon the point
estimates of the baseline hazard, the evidence in support of the
standard search model is at best mixed, with the increasing hazard
for the first five months weakly supporting the search
interpretation, and the subsequent non-monotonicity at variance with
the predictions of the model.
The evidence of a downward sloping portion of the new job hazard
is contrary to Katz's findings using PSID data. Some possible
explanations for the differences between the two results have already
been suggested, namely the presence of heterogeneity bias or the fact
that the basic composition of the two samples differs substantively.
The latter explanation, which relies on the existence of very
different layoff and search behavior across industry and occupation
types, implies that simple models of unemployment and search are
inadequate in explaining behavior.
Finally, the one unexplained finding in the estimates of the
models has been the spike in the hazard rates for both new job and
recall at around 18 weeks. There is no obvious explanation for the
importance of this spike, though the spike may very well be related
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Figure 7 - Estimated Monthly New Job Hazard
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to the exhaustion of UI benefits. Additional work will be required
to determine whether it is merely an artifact of the data and the
techniques used for calculating spells in the SIPP data, or whether
there is a more fundamental relationship that has been missed.
6. Conclusion
This analysis of unemployment durations using the SIPP data
takes advantage of the benefits accruing to the use of this data. In
particular, I am able to examine simultaneously the effects of UI
benefit receipt on the hazards of exit from unemployment via either
new job or recall. The durations used in this analysis are
calculated on the basis of weekly data on labor force status and are
therefore not subject to much of the error in calculating durations
that has resulted from the use of alternative data sources.
At the same time, the current analysis does not take full
advantage of a great wealth of previously unavailable information
provided by the SIPP. In particular, the future availability of the
work history supplement should allow researchers to examine questions
about labor force mobility in considerably greater detail. Moreover,
the supplement will allow for the verification of some of the more
curious aspects of labor force behavior found in this and other
papers. For those reasons, the results presented here should be
considered a preliminary examination of the SIPP data.
Having said that, there are some important lessons that can be
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taken away from the current analysis. First, based upon the spells
of unemployment calcualted from the weekly SIPP data, it appears that
the current emphasis on examining the duration of a given spell of
unemployment is missplaced. The very large numbers of short term
spells combined with the large fraction of individuals with multiple
spells points to a need to examine the question of duration in
conjunction with the question of spell frequency. This is not a new
idea, but it has been relatively neglected in recent empirical work.
The results of this paper also suggest that while UI has the
expected positive impact upon the duration of a spell, the
relationship is more complex than as described by search theory. For
one thing, the strong influence of UI in altering the recall hazard
suggests that the interaction between UI and firm layoff policy
deserves additional empirical attention.
Finally, given the differences in behavior across risks implied
by the estimates of coefficients and the baseline hazard in the
competing risk models, the important task of identifying the
differences between behavior associated with recall and with new job
finding first undertaken by Katz should be continued. Despite the
mixed support for the standard search models in the SIPP data, it may
well be that examining the duration of unemployment spells in a more
general framework will yield results that support the implications of
a standard search model. But this preliminary analysis suggests that
steps in the direction of a more general framework are still needed.
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Chapter 3
Semi-parametric Proportional
Hazards Estimation of Single and Competing Risks Models
with Time-varying Covariates
Introduction
Economists increasingly have become involved in the development
and use of techniques for the analysis of duration data. Duration
models provide a convenient framework for the examination of economic
phenomena which yield data on the length of time before an event
occurs. The length of unemployment spells, the number of years to
retirement, and the duration of a labor strike are but a few of the
applications to which hazard models have been applied.
Since its introduction by Cox [1972], the proportional hazards
model has become the standard for the examination of failure time
data. A number of refinements of the basic Cox model have been
developed. Recent econometric research on proportional hazards
duration models has focused on estimation methods which reduce the
number of functional form restrictions. This effort has been
motivated by concern over possible biases resulting from parametric
misspecification of either the baseline hazard or the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity.
While techniques for the non-parameteric estimation of the
heterogeneity distribution have been proposed, these generally have
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been carried out in the context of a parametric specification for the
baseline hazard (see, for example, Heckman and Singer (1985]). Work
by Han and Hausman (1986] and Manton, Stallard and Vaupel [1986)
suggests that the biases in the proportional hazards framework may be
larger for misspecification of the baseline hazard than the for
misspecified heterogeneity distributions. Accordingly, it should be
more productive to consider the relaxation of restrictions on the
baseline hazard.
There exist several techniques for the estimation of models
without parametric restrictions upon the baseline hazard, but each of
these has some limitations on general applicability. The
Kaplan-Meier (1958] product limit estimator is limited by the
assumption of a homogeneous population. Cox's [1972] partial
likelihood technique handles naturally the inclusion of covariates,
but the introduction of unobservable heterogeneity is computationally
intractable. Han and Hausman [1986] propose an estimation technique
that is based upon the regression form of the proportional hazards
model and allows for covariates, heterogeneity and competing risks.
The first two chapters of this thesis consist of applications of
these techniques to the study of retirement and unemployment.
However, the properties of this estimator are only shown to hold for
the special case where the covariates are constant over time. A
related technique has been suggested by Prentice and Gloeckler [1978]
which allows for time-varying covariates, but has not been appplied
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to the case of competing risks. Given the importance of panel data
in economic research and the number of cases in which there is more
than one risk, a model that utilizes these semi-parametric estimation
techniques but allows for time-varying covariates and competing modes
of failure is needed.
In this chapter, I consider a more general specification of the
regression form of the proportional hazards likelihood function used
in chapters 1 and 2. The more general form of the model admits
time-varying covariates and extends readily to the competing risks
framework. This specification is an extension of the Han and Hausman
technique and posesses the natural advantages of that estimator
without the limitations upon the distribution of covariates over
time. I also demonstrate identification and asymptotic normality of
both the single and dual risk estimators.1
In section 1, I outline the specification of the semi-
parameteric single risk hazard model and demonstrate identification
and asymptotic normality of the estimator. Section 2 contains
analagous results for the competing risk case. There is a brief
concluding section.
'The single risk model considered here is merely a transformation of
the Prentice and Gloeckler model to the regression form so that the
identification results are not particularly original. They are
presented along with the original dual risk results in an effort to
provide a unified framework for the estimation of semi-parametric
models with time-varying covariates.
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1. Single-Risk Duration Models
1.1. Specification
Following standard hazard specification practice the hazard rate
for individual i is assumed to be of the proportional hazards (Cox
[1972]) form:
(1.1) A(tlX (t),p) = A,(t) exp(X (t)p)
where A,(t) is a possibly unknown function of the elapsed duration
and X1 (t)' and p are k x 1 column vectors. This implies that the
probability of observing a (continuous) failure time at time period t
is given by (suppressing the subscript for individual i):
t
(1.2) f(t X,p) = A(t) exp(X(t)p) exp (-4 A.(s) exp(X(s)p) ds)
In the special case where the covariates do not vary over time so
that X(t) = X V t, this specification can be rewritten in the
equivalent regression form:
t
(1.3) MItX,p) =Pr(log foAO(s) ds + Xp e
PH t,~ + XA = 0)
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where E has an extreme value distribution and I f A0 (s) ds. Han
and Hausman (HH) [1986] show that this specification implies that the
hazard model may be estimated without parametric specification of the
baseline hazard function A(t). The estimation technique involves
maximizing an ordered logit likelihood where the categories are
defined by the failure times. The constant terms in the model
correspond to functions of the baseline hazard evaluated at discrete
points, so that the unknown function A,(t) is estimated as a step
function.
The extension of this model to the case of time-varying
covariates is relatively straightforward, and begins with the
standard change of variables to derive the alternative form of the
likelihood function. First, recall that the likelihood of observing
a failure time at time period t is given by (1.2). Define the
transformation:
t
(1.4) 0(t) = J A,(s) exp(X(s)p) ds
di = A0 (t) exp(X(t)p) dt
dt c o v from t to ?1
and consider the resulting change of variables from t to P.
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(1.5) f (r IX,p) ft(r1 (t) jXp) dI
= exp()
which is the density function of an exponential random variable.
Define a second transformation from r to e:
(1.6) 6(r) = 1og(0)
d = de
dr
so that
(1.7) f (6 1Xp) f,(6 1 (?r)Xp) .
= exp(C-exp(e))
so that & has an extreme value distribution. This transformation
result is identical to that derived for the case of non-time varying
covariates considered by HH. This specification of the proportional
hazards model and that given in (1.3) differ in that the linear
regression form for the impact of the covariates does not hold when
the latter are allowed to vary over time. To see this, return to the
general specification given in (1.2) where the unconditional density
function depends upon time-varying covariates X(t). Then, using the
definitions given in (1.4) and (1.6), the model can be written as
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t
(1.8) f(tIX,p) = Pr(log (J A,(s) exp(X(s)p) ds) =
where e again follows the extreme value distribution. Since both the
hazard and the covariates vary over time, the strong separability
observed in (1.3) does not hold. Note that if x(t) is constant then
(1.8) does simplify to the time-invariant form.
Since all of the terms in the integral of (1.8) are positive,
the integral is monotonically increasing in t so that the probability
that the failure time is less than t is given by
(1.9) F(tIX,p) = Pr(log (J' A,(s) exp(X(s)p) ds) + Xp 6)
The probability that the failure time is in the interval (t-1,tJ is
simply F(t JX,p) - F(t-1JX,p).
In order to estimate this model semi-parametrically, it is
necessary to take advantage of the discrete nature of the data by
placing conditions on the evolution of the covariates over time.
Specifically, I will assume that the time-varying covariates X(t) are
constant over intervals defined in discrete time. More formally, if
there are T potential failure times, then X(j-4) = X(j); 4 e (0,1), j
The assumption that variables are constant over a discrete
interval is quite reasonable for most applications. Economic data
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that are collected over time are invariably sampled at discrete
intervals. While some financial data are collected as often as daily
or even hourly, standard survey data are generated more infrequently,
generally yearly. Even for the relatively rare hourly data, the
observation interval is discrete in the sense that the data do not
include observations on the continuous evolution of the variables.
The assumption that covariates are constant over the observation
interval is a natural one given the inherent discreteness of sampling
and the lack of a priori knowledge about the path of the data between
discrete observations over time. 2
Under these assumptions, the specification of the likelihood of
an observation on a failure time is straightforward. For notational
convenience, define the following terms:
(1.10) r(j) J AO(s) ds,
i-i
Z(j) exp(X(j)p),
r
*P r log (IZ(i)T(i)),
r = 1,2,...,T, where the constancy of X(t) over an interval implies
2The assumption of time-varying variables that are constant over an
interval is not actually requried. So long as one is willing to make
an assumption about the evolution of the variables over the interval,
then the identification results below will follow. Alternative
specifications of this process may, however, complicate the
likelihood function considerably.
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that Z(s-4) = Z(s), s = 1,...,T ; 4 E (0,1). For expositional
purposes, failure times are assumed to occur in the interval prior to
the recorded failure time so that a failure time of t represents
failure in the half-open interval (t-1,tJ. Then denoting r =
(r(1),---,r(T)), the likelihood of observing a failure in the
discrete interval (t-1,tj is given by
(1.11) Lt 'r iX) = t f() de = F(-t) - F( )t-1
t-1
while the likelihood of observing a censored failure at t is
(1.12) L (p,TIX) f(e) dA = 1 - F(-P )
t
Inspection of the likelihood functions (1.11) and (1.12) reveals
a close correspondence between the t-functions and the t-functions
found in HH. In this more general specification, the constant terms
in the ordered logit are not simply functions of the baseline hazard,
but rather are functions of weighted sums of the discrete segments of
the baseline hazard, with the weights corresponding to the effects of
the time-varying covariates. If there are time-constant covariates,
they enter the function as a standard separate linear term rather
than as weights.
Consider an independent sample of the form (y.,Xi,65) i=1,...,N,
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where y. are indicators on failure for individual i for each time
period, X. are individual and time-specific vectors of covariates,
and o. are censoring indicators for each time period. Then the log
likelihood of the sample is given by:
N T
(1.13) log L(pT) z I [ yit(1-it) log(F(eP) - F(i1
i=1 t= t
+6,i log(1 - F(t )) 3
The addition of unobserved individual heterogeneity to the model
is straightforward and requires only one additional order of
integration. If the heterogeneity is of standard multiplicative form
(A(tjX,p) = 9 AO(t) exp(X(t)p)) then all that is required to add
heterogeneity to the model is to replace the distribution function
F(6) with E F (e+919). It is easy to derive a closed-form
expression for this likelihood in the case where 9 has a gamma
distribution (Appendix 2).
1.2 Identification, Consistency and Asymptotic Normality
Under suitable regularity conditions, the maximum likelihood
estimator of the likelihood function (1.13) is consistent and
asymptotically normal. Given the close relationship between the
ordered logit form of this likelihood and the likelihoods associated
with the general multinomial response model, the following discussion
follows closely the existing discrete choice literature. All results
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assume a finite number of periods T.
The proof of consistency and asymptotic normality involves
verifying the conditions discussed in McFadden [1984] and is
completed in three stages. First I show that the identification
condition (4) of McFadden is implied by showing that the time
interval probabilities are uniquely determined, period by period.
Second, I demonstrate that under rather weak regularity conditions on
the data, r and p uniquely determine the CDF evaluation points, and
hence the interval probabilities for all observations. For the case
where there is individual heterogeneity, slightly stronger conditions
are required. Finally, I verify that the other necessary assumptions
for consistency and asymptotic normality are satisfied.
Consider a sample log likelihood function of the form given in
(1.13). I make the following initial assumptions:
AJ.1 - Error Distribution -
The distribution function F is continuous and twice
differentiable with density function f ) 0 almost everywhere.
A1.2 - Covariates -
The domain of the explanatory variables is a measurable subset
of R with probability P(x), where k is an integer such that k ( oo.
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Al.3 - Parafieters -
The true parameter vector 90,=(p,r,) is an interior point of the
k T
parameter space, the compact set B x L, where B c P , L c RT
These relatively innocuous conditions correspond to regularity
conditions (1), (2), (3) and (5) of McFadden [1984]. In general, the
present assumptions are stronger than their counterparts.
To insure identification, consistency and asymptotic normality,
additional conditions on the data are required:
A1.2 Covariates
Add to the existing assumptions,
(i) boundedness - 3 M < o, s.t. E jX 13 <
(ii) non-degeneracy - for V ceR, pk (pOO), 3 t, s.t.
Pr (X (t)p = c) ( 1.
A1.4 Information
The information matrix evaluated at the true parameter vector,
defined as,
J() dP(x) Pr (x;e log Pr t(x; OP) a log Prt (x;)
t=1
is non-singular.
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Assumption A.1.2.(i) implies that McFadden condition (6) holds.
Assumption A1.2.(ii) is essentially a linear independence condition
on the X. It is analagous to the non-singularity of the design
matrix in least squares estimation and is a natural generalization of
the HH condition (A1.2) to the case of time-varying covariates.
Note, however, that this condition requires only that the covariates
associated with at least one period have a non-degenerate
distribution, rather than placing restrictions upon the behavior in
every period. The information matrix assumption is self-explanatory.
Note that the likelihood function given in (1.13) may be written
as a special case of the general multinomial response model:
N M
(1.14) L(A,r) = Z yim log Pr (X it')
i=1 m=1
where the y. are indicator functions on individuals i and categories
w, and the Prm are the probabilities defined over the m categories.
In this particular application, the categories are defined by the
failure time intervals. 3
The correspondence between the ordered logit model and the
3In the preceeding discussion, censoring is ignored. The addition of
independently censored observations does not change the identification
results, but requires somewhat more complex notation to normalize the
probabilities.
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general case considered by McFadden implies that for this
specification, the identification condition is given by (4) of
McFadden-
(4 - McFadden) For V e > 0, 3 8 ( 0 such that je,-ej & implies:
dP(x) z pt (xe)Pr (x;) 1
t=1 Pr (x;,)j
Intuitively, the condition requires that there be no parameter vector
that achieves as high a limiting value of the log likelihood as the
true value.
There is a restatement of this condition which makes the
demonstration of identication somewhat easier. Using the fundamental
information inequality, Rao (1.e.6), and taking advantage of the fact
that the probabilities are exhaustive over the t categories so that
z Pr t(X;e 0 ) = z Pr t(X;e) v 9, condition (4-McFadden) implies that:
(1.15) J dP(x) z P(x;:) ]
t=1 Pr (x;80)
T (Prt (x;90 ) - Pr (x;e))
- dP(x) z
t=1 Pr (x;e,) 2 g(x)
which is < 0.
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Since the terms in the numerator and denominator are
non-negative, given continuity on the Prt in 9 for V X, equality
holds if each of the category probabilities are identical under e and
90 for X with positive probability.4 This implies that demonstrating
the identification condition for the ordered logit model requires
showing that conditional upon X, the CDF evaluation points are
uniquely determined by choice of p and r. By standard arguments,
demonstrating that no other parameter vector yields as high a value
of the continuous in 9 limiting log likelihood implies A1.4, the
non-singularity of J(e).
The proof of the uniqueness of the intervals is straightforward.
To prove uniqueness, I will make use of the following induction
lemma:
Lemma 1.1 - If the parameters for the first K-1 intervals are
identified, then the additional parameter for the K-th interval is
also identified.
Proof: Suppose that the first K-1 intervals are identified. Then
in considering the K-th interval it suffices to restrict the relevant
comparison of parameters to the subspace of the parameter space for
4Continuity of the Prt in a follows from the continuity assumption on
the underlying f and F functions and the definition of the
'-functions.
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which the wK1 (p,r (1),(2). ,r(K-1)) are equal.5 Consider two
distinct sets of parameters r, = (WK-11,I(K)) and r2 = (WK-1'r2K),
for any valid choice of WK-1 = (,.(1) , ?(2) , - ,?(K-1)). Changing
notation slightly, recall that
K
PK K (K-1,r(K)) = log ( I exp(X(s)p)r(s)).
s=1
Then the probability of r, and r 2 yielding the same PK is
Pr = 0g[K-1 K-2 ,(K)) + exp(X(s)5)Tr(K))
= 0[*PK-1 K-2 2) + exp(X(s) p)r MK
Pr ( 1(K) = r2(K)),
which equals 0 since r,(K) * r2 (K) by assumption. Thus, provided
that the K-1 preceeding intervals are identified, the K-th interval
is identified.
The identification lemma follows directly from this result.
5Consideration of the unrestricted space is not necessary since the
identification of the parameters for the first K-1 periods implies
that the parameters for the K-1 periods are identical.
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Lemma 1.2 - Given A1.1-A1.3, the interval probabilities are uniquely
determined by choice of p and r.
Proof: For this model, the uniqueness of the interval
probabilities is equivalent to the uniqueness of the evaluation
points. Without loss of generality, assume that the first K-1
periods have degenerate X's and that uniqueness of the p and
r-vectors is not guaranteed. Define the terms ct (pr) = exp(X(t)p)
r(t), t = 1,...,T. From the definitions above, it follows that
t
It ('r) = log( Cs (,).
s=1
Since the first K-1 periods are degenerate, it is possible to
have two sets of parameters which yield the same evaluation points
for each period. Thus, for wK-1 1' (1',..' (K-l)) and wK-i
(pr,(1) ,--,rk(K-1)) each of the evaluation points is identical so
that ct 'r) = ct'(pl 1T), t = 1,...,K-1. Then, defining SK-1 ('I)
K-1
Sz ct (p,'r), it follows that SK-1 (Po'To K-1
t=1
Now consider the K-th period. Rewrite PK(A'T) = log(SK,1(pr) +
cK(plT)). Since SK-1 must be identical across any possible parameter
comparisons, it suffices to demonstrate the identification of cK'
Consider two sets of parameters r. = (p1 1 r1 ), and r 2 = (pA2 1,r2) which
are drawn from a subspace of the parameter space that yields
ct ( 1T1 ) = ct(pA2 rr), t = 1,...,K-1. Then the probability that the
two sets of parameters yield the same evaluation point is given by:
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PrX(exp(X(K)pl)Tr(K) = exp(X(K)p 2 )7 2 (K))
Pr X(X(K)p = x)
where x is a constant equal to -log(r,(K)/r 2 (K)). By A1.2, this
probability is strictly less than 1 for all choice of A and p2 so
that the 3 and r(K) are identified.
Since p is identified, it follows immediately that r(1) is
identified; the conditions c 1(P, 1 ) = c1 ( 21 72) and Pi = 2 imply
trivially that r(1) = r2(1). Thus, the parameters for the first
interval are identified. Application of the Lemma 1.1 implies that
the parameters for every period are identified.
Under suitable regularity conditions standard theory can be
applied to derive the asymptotic distribution of the maximum
likelihood estimator of 0. The asymptotic results assume that the
number of intervals T is fixed while the sample size K - e. The
results are summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1.1 - Given A1.1-A1.3, then almost surely a unique maximum
likelihood estimator satisfying 6N 'A N)' LN(9)13 = 0
eventually exists and GN -+ ** Furthermore, .A(e - e0)
a , )1I-- (O,J(eo) )
- 172 -
Proof: A1.1-A1.3 and the Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2 imply that conditions
1-6 of McFadden are satisfied so that the McFadden Theorem 2
demonstrating consistency applies. A1.4 is equivalent to regularity
condition 7 of McFadden and follows given A1.1-A1.3. Asymptotic
normality follows by Theorem 3 of McFadden. It is easy to verify
that the ordered extreme value model satisfies the assumptions in
A1.1. I assume that the data and parameters satisfy A1.2, A1.3.
Consider now the case where there is unobserved individual
heterogeneity. The proofs follow closely HH with allowance made for
the different assumptions and more complicated notation needed for
the extension to time-varying covariates. Assume that the
heterogeneity is of the standard multiplicative form and that
E F (e+919) can be rewritten as F (y), where Y is a finite
dimensional parameter vector.
To demonstrate the identification condition, it is necessary to
show that there do not exist different combinations of (p,r,T)
parameters that will yield the same CDF values for all possible
observations on the covariates. Note that in the absence of
heterogeneity, it was necessary only to show that the evaluation
points are the same. Since the shape of the distribution function
depends upon the parameter vector ', it is necessary here to consider
the actual probability values generated by the covariates. This
requires substantive modifications in the assumptions given in
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Al. 1-Al. 3:
A1.1' - Error Distribution -
(i) The distribution function for the error term p, F(pJ-),
depends upon an m x 1 finite dimensional parameter vector
7, is twice differentiable in /p and 7, and has density
function f(p)> 0 almost everywhere, V 7 e R.
(ii) The set 1yjf(ji) = a f(b_+c p70)1 has Lebesgue measure
zeroV7 eR! and a,b,c e R.
AJ.2' - Covariates-
In addition to A1.2.(i) and A1.2.(ii) the following assumption
is made about the covariates:
(iii) For some t e f1,...,TI satisfying A1.2.(ii), 9 h e
i1,...,k) s.t. ph 0 0 and, conditional on xh(t), the vector
of covariates with the h-th element of the t-th period
deleted, Xh(t) has positive density in an open neighborhood
in IR a.s. PX'
A1.3' - Parameters -
The true parameter vector 0 =(p 0,r 0 , i) is an interior point of
the parameter space, the compact set B x L x M where B c R k, L c RT
M C 0.
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The assumption A1.1.(i)' places conditions upon the conditional
distribution function analagous to those in A1.1.(i) which insure
that it is well behaved for all values of 7. The additional
assumption on the density function, A1.1.(ii)' is used in conjunction
with the additional condition on the covariates A1.2.(iii)' to
guarantee that there is enough variability and continuity in the data
across observations and in the density function over different values
of - so that the evaluation points can be separated from the -
parameter.6 Note that the t in A1.2.(iii)' refers to the same period
as the t in A1.2.(ii).
Under these assumptions, the following lemma demonstrates
uniqueness of the interval probabilities:
Lemaw 1.3 - Given A1.1-A1.3, the interval probabilities are uniquely
determined by choice of p, r and f.
Proof: I will restrict the discussion to the case where Yi o
since if v = , the proof from above applies. For 7 70 is
sufficient to show that there does not exist e * a., such that for
V t, PrX [F(Pt())) = F(Pt (9))] = 1. In particular, this
6The assumption A1.1(ii)' rules out cases like a mixture of a normal
error terms with normal heterogeneity. For obvious reasons, it is
impossible to separate out the heterogeneity parameter from the
underlying p and r in a normal mixture model.
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relationship must hold for a period s satisfying A1.2.(iii)'.
Suppose that such a e exists. Define X(s) and p which are the
appropriate parts of the X(s) and p vectors with the h-th element
deleted, and the evaluation point
Rs ' ' = t-1 (e)) + expfX(s)p + (Xh(s)+d)phI (s).
Note that Rs (,X,O) = ?s(e). Since X(s) is assumed not to be
degenerate, Fs( s (,X,O)) = F s(Rs (OX,O)) V X, and F is assumed to
be continuous and differentiable, it follows that
lim
AZ0
F(R t(e,X,4) 1) - F ( 1
46
lim F(R t , X, 4) 110) -F t 9 O
for v Xh(s) in the open neighborhood of R discussed in A1.2.(iii)'.
Then
fOPs()1-Y) = a f(Ps(O)+bI70)
Ioh exp(X(s)p,) r.(s)
ph exp(X(s) p) r(s)
exp('s (9))
exp(s(90))
where
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and b = P( 0 ) - P().
By A1.2.(iii)', the set of X(s)'s which satisfy this
relationship has positive Lebesgue measure so that the set of
I-evaluation points satisfying this relationship has positive
measure, violating A1.1.(ii)'.
The consistency and asymptotic normality results follow
immediately:
Theorem 1.2 - Given A1.1'-A1.3', then almost surely a unique maximum
likelihood estimator satisfying eN (PN' NIN), aLN (e)I.e = 0
eventually exists and eN -0 00. Furthermore, )f(9 - 00) i
N(0,J(e0 ) 1).
Proof: A1.1'-A1.3' and the Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2 imply that the
consistency conditions are satisfied. Since A1.4 holds under
A1.1'-A1.3', the model satisfies the asymptotic normality conditions.
2. Competing Risks Models
2.1 Specification
The competing risks model can be cast in terms of the familiar
latent variables specification. Suppose that there are random
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variables for J different potential failure times T., j = 1,...J
where only the first realized failure time is observed so that T =
min IT I. I assume the cause-specific hazard rates at time
period t for cause J to be of the proportional hazards form
(2.1) A (t|X (t),p ) = A o(t) exp(X (t)A ).
Ruling out simultaneous failures, the overall hazard is simply Zi A .
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1984] point out that the standard
likelihood function factors into separate components for each risk
where failures of an alternative type are treated as censored
observations. This implies that the transformation to the regression
form of the likelihood function given above is valid for competing
risks. First define the cause-specific analogues to the terms in
(1.9):
(2.2) r.(r) [ A.0 (s) ds,
Z (r) a exp(X (r)p ),
r
l Jog ( Z Z.(i)r.(i)),
r i=1 3
for j = 1,...,J. Then the unconditional density for a failure of
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type j at time t can be written in the equivalent form = e. wheret
the error terms e . are independent extreme value errors.
Specializing to the case of bivariate independent competing
risks where data are again observed at discrete intervals, the
specification of a likelihood function is similar to the case for
non-time varying covariates. First, consider the simple case of an
observation censored at time period t:
(2.3) L c(P'r jtX) = 1 2 1' ) dA2 dA.
t t
With discrete data, the likelihood of an observed failure of a given
type is somewhat more involved because the integration must insure
that the latent failure time is greater than the observed failure
time for every point in the discrete interval. If, without loss of
generality, a failure of type 1 is observed in the interval (t-1,t],
the likelihood is given by
1
(2.4) L 1(P'r X) , fJ A ALtpi fIX 1 06)22 V
t-
where the g(-) function insures that the required relationship
between the failure times holds. Then for a failure of type 1, the
functional form of g(.) is given by:
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(2.5)
2 2 2
gP) 2_ + Q - 1 -
S 1 t 1 1
t t-1
The derivation of g(-) involves the assumption that the
evaluation points change at a constant rate over the discrete
intervals. Consider a failure time t which lies in the interval
(t-1,t. Then given the assumption of linearity in the change in
evaluation points over the interval,
(2.6) > -$P* = f + ( - 1 (t -(t-1))t t-1 t t-1
j=1,2. Solving for (t -(t-1)) for both risks and setting the terms
equal to each other yields
(2.7)
* 1
' -t-
1 t-1
* 2
'2 t-1
t t-1
and solving for '2 in terms of e yields the desired result.
Suppose that an independent sample on data of the form
7This assumption is analagous to the one made by Han and Hausman. The
functional form of the g-function implied by the linearity is somewhat
more complicated because the the non-separability of the covariates from
the hazard. Note, however, that in the case of constant covarariates,
the likelihood reduces to the HH case.
- 180 -
1 2 k
(y.,yiX ,.5) i=1,...,N, are observed where y are indicators on
failure of type k for individual i at each period, X. are individual
and time-specific vectors of covariates, and 8. are censoring
indicators for each time period. Then the log likelihood of the
sample is:
(2.8) log LN ('r)
N T 2 k
i=1 t=1 k=1 it it] + 6it It*
As in the single risk case, it is possible to replace the
density function f in (2.3) and (2.4) with a density function that
depends upon a finite dimensional parameter f( -j7). The additional
parameter can be thought of as arising from either unobserved
heterogeneity, correlation between the underlying risks or some
combination of the two. The assumption adopted by HH is to assume
that f(. 17) is a bivariate normal where i is the correlation
coefficient p.
2.2 Identification, Consistency and Asymptotic Normality
As with the single risk case, the likelihood (2.8) is a special
case of the general multinomial response model with the categories
defined by the failure type and time interval combinations. As a
result, demonstrating identification involves showing that the
probabilities associated with each failure time and type combination
- 181 -
are unique with respect to choice of , ,p2 'Ti' 2 and p.
The proof will be undertaken in three steps. In the first two,
I demonstrate that the identification condition holds. In
particular, I show that for a given set of probabilities associated
with each failure time and type, the evaluation points in the
bivariate distribution function are uniquely determined. I then show
that given realizations on the covariates the set of evaluation
points is unique with respect to choice of the parameter vector.
Finally I verify the additional conditions required for consistency
and asymptotic normality. I make the following assumptions:
A2.1 - Error Distribution -
The distribution function F is continuous and twice
differentiable with density function f ) 0 almost everywhere.
A2.2 - Covariates -
The domain of the explanatory variables is a measurable subset
of Rk, with probability P(x) where k=k 1+k2, and k1,k2 are integers
such that k1 ,k2 ( a. The following conditions are also satisfied:
(i) boundedness - 3 M ( c, s. t.
EIXI '3 M,
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(ii) non-degeneracy 
- for v ceR, p1 k 'p1 o), A24k2 (0 2 O),
3 t and i e 11,21, s.t.
Pr (X (t)p. = c) ( 1,
where X (t) is the vector of covariates for risk i at time period t.
A2.3 - Parameters -
The true parameter vector *0=(p1,,p2 r1 0 2, 2) is an interior
point of the parameter space, the compact set B x B2 x L x L2'
where B c R , BC2 C RRT L 2 T
The first step is to show that a given set of failure type/time
probabilities yields unique interval evaluation points. Recall that
the probabilities are given by functions of the form (2.4). Consider
two adjacent evaluation points, (1 ,2 ) and (OI I , - will
first show for a given period, that if two sets of non-identical
evaluation points yield the same interval probabilities, then the
evaluation points for both periods differ. This result can be used
to show that the evaluation points are uniquely determined by the
choice-specific probabilities. More formally,
Lemma 2.1 - Suppose that there exist two sets of evaluation points
1 2 1 2 ) (1 ,2 )1 2U 1O I OP-i t , -P )H and 1( 4tt -i It - v('t~*t)I that yield the same
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1 2
choice-specific probabilities defined over (t-1,t]. Then (Ot )
1 -2 1 2 -1 -2(op , ) implies that (*t-1' t-1 ) t-1 t-1)'
Proof: Suppose that the two sets of evaluation points discussed
1 2 1 -2 1 _
above exist and that (pi-10' ) = (-t'-). Let - = c
andt _= - = c2 for some constants c1 ,c2 e . There are no
restrictions on the underlying parameters (p,r) and (p,r). Without
~1 1
loss of generality, let T > rt. Since the interval probabilities
are assumed to be the same,
(2.9) t 'e2) de de t 'f(e1,e2) de2 de1( 29 1 ) 12 c d h 1 ) d 1
where
r2
t -c2
1 2 +(p - c 1
~2
Ot 1
h 1() = c2 + (p - c1 ) -
*t 1 
The equality in (2.9) and assumption that f has positive density
almost everywhere implies that h1 (-) > g(-). This in turn requires
that
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(2.10)
-2
t 2
t c 1
2 -c
t 2
t -c
and
> ?2 + (-
The last inequality guarantees t
probabilities are of the form
(2.11)
,2 -
t '
hat > 2. The type 2 interval
f1'if 2) dc. de 2'
-2
f t f 
o 0
c 2 b 2 (62
where b2 is of the same form as b but with the indices reversed.
With some manipulation of the integrals, (2.11) can be rewritten as
(2.12)
+
2ft o
c2 92 2
~2
2
t 2 2
f '(elF2) de1 de2
f(E,1,e2) de de2
Jh2  2) f (elf 2 ) d-1 dE2
9 2 2)
+
~2
t
C2
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2 2
where 92 is analagous to g1 . Since t t the second term in (2.12)
is strictly greater than 0 so that the equality of (2.11) and (2.12)
holds if and only if h2 92. But this inequality contradicts
(2.10). Thus, if (P, ) t , ), a necessary condition for
1 2probability interval equality over (t-1,t) is (i' -
~1 ~2
(pt-1' 1Pt-1*
This result implies that the entire sequence of evaluation points is
unique:
1 2 2 2
Lemma 2.2 - If two sets of evaluation points 1 (?,* O ) ,
and (t ,p 1),...,( T, )1 yield the same set of choice-specific
probabilities, then = t = 1,...,T, j = 1,2.
_t t'
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose that there is an
1 2 -1-2
evaluation point (P tt,) (It, ) where the interval probabilities
are the same. Then working backward by repeated application of Lemma
1 2 1-2
2.1, the first interval evaluation points differ, (P , P) (i ,)
But this result yields a contradiction since ( , -) = )=
(-oo,-(6) .
The final lemma demonstrates that under regularity conditions on
the distribution of the covariates, a set of evaluation points
uniquely determines the p,r.
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Lemma 2.3 - Given A2.1-A2.3, the choice-specific interval
probabilities are uniquely determined by choice of p=(pp 2) and
r=(r1 ,r2).
Proof: Lemmas 2.1-2.2 imply that showing uniqueness of the
evaluation points is sufficient to demonstrate uniqueness of the
probabilities. Note that the choice-specific evaluation points for
each risk are of the same form as the single risk evaluation points
in section 1. A2.1-A2.3 satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1.3 for each
risk, therefore application of Lemma 1.3 to either risk provides the
uniqueness result.
These results imply that under rather weak assumptions the
standard consistency and asymptotic normality results hold. The
results are described in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 - Given A2.1-A2.3, then almost surely a unique maximum
likelihood estimator satisfying ^N 2 ^1 , 2 , 0
eventually exists and eN -+ *. Furthermore, W(e - e0 ) a
N(0,J(90 ) 1).
Proof: A2.1-A2.3 and the lemmas imply that the consistency
conditions of McFadden Theorem 2 are satisfied. The assumptions
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imply that A1.4 is satisfied so that the model satisfies the
asymptotic normality conditions of McFadden Theorem 3.
Finally, I consider the case where the distribution function
depends upon a finite-dimensional parameter i. As with the single
risk case, the identification of this model requires stronger
conditions upon the covariates and the distribution function of the
error. I make the following modifications to the assumptions given
in A2.1-A2.3:
A2.1' - Error Distribution -
(i) The distribution function for the error term F(., -I)
depends upon an m x 1 finite dimensional parameter vector 7, is
continuous and twice differentiable in its arguments and in i, and
has density function f > 0 almost everywhere V i e RM
(ii) One of the following applies:
(a) If the covariates differ across risks so that X 1 x2
then
p1 +bl p2+b2The set I ("'"'M2) iY11i,p 2 1 Y) = a f( c ' c 0
2 2
has R 2-Lebesgue measure zero for i * io, V
a,bi,b 2 'c1,c2 C R.
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(b) If the covariates are the same across risks so that
x = 2 = X, then for F1 and F2 the marginal CDFs, the
set
P + a P + a
Fp F (p' a2  Y) + b1 F2 (pl a2
p + dy + d 3 110 + d, p + d 3 1H
= F(d ' d 1o + 2 d'd2 4 2 4
has Lebesgue measure zero for 7 * 7. and all constants
a,b,c,d,e e R.
A2.2' - Covariates -
In addition to A2.2, assume the following: (iii) For some t e
11,...,T1 satisfying A2.2.(ii), 3 h. e fl,...,k 1, s~t. for j=1,2
(a) Pjh. * ,
(b) Conditional on X jh(t) defined as the vector of
covariates with the h.-th element of the t-th period
deleted, Xjh (t) has positive density in an open
neighborhood in R a.s. P .
A2.3' - Parameters -
The true parameter vector 9e=(p 1O,p20 1 0 , 20 ' ) is an interior
point of the parameter space, the compact set B x B2 x L x L2 x M,
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where B c R k, B2 C k2 , L ,L2 C ' M m
The additional assumptions on the distribution function and
covariates are analagous to the additional assumptions made in the
single risk case, and allow for separation of the 7 parameter from
the evaluation points. For the case where the covariates are the
same, the distributional assumption is modified slightly to account
for differences in the way that derivatives of the CDFs are taken.
In practical terms however, the two assumptions are quite similar in
spirit.
Lemma 2.4 - Given A2.1'-A2.3', the choice-specific interval
probabilities are uniquely determined by choice of O=(p ,#2' 1' 2'
Proof: As before, I will restrict the discussion to the case where
* T .. The notation that I use is a multiple risk generalization of
the notation used in Lemma 1.3 above. First recall that the
cause-specific evaluation points for period t are given by &, j=1,2.
For period s satisfying A2.2' above, define X 1 (s), X2 (s)', p1 , p2 as
the relevant vectors with the h and h2 elements deleted as required.
The analogue to the single risk R-evaluation point functions is given
by
- 190 -
R3 (9,X,4.)
log exp(* (8)) + exp(X (s)P. + (Xjh(s) + 4.),jh.) (s)e s-1 Jh 3 J
for j=1,2. Note once again that R (e,X,0) = (9).
S
The cause specific probabilities for the interval (t-1,t], Pj(&)t
are given by equations of the form (2.3) and (2.4). Manipulation of
the integrals in (2.3) and (2.4) reveals that Z P(8) =j t
F(OP1 (9),P (9)) F(P _ (8),1 (9)). Suppose that there exits a 9 A
e that generates the same set of choice-specific interval
probabilities so that P (9) = P (0) a.s. PX, V t, j=1,2. Int t
particular, for period s described above
F(1 (a),P (9) F( (a) _ (9))
s s s-i ()s-1
F(P1 (9)'P2 1FO a - 2_(
s s s-i s-1
a.s. P Since - and vs-_ are invariant with respect to X (s),X*s-i s-i 1
this implies that
lim 1 ( eX , 1 ) ,R (9,X, 42 ) 1 ) - F P 1 ( ) , P (9)
1 2 1 2
- im F(R s(9'0 VXI',),R 3(G90 , 2) IY<e) -F(? 5s(Go), I%(,) -o
lim~
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If the X's differ across risks, then taking the limits gives the
condition that for all x (s), Xjj(s) in an open neighborhood of R2
1 2
f P1 (9 P2 12f(s (e),t (e) P3v) = p3 (P ((G)+p2 o
where
P = ?(G) - (e), j=1,23 sO
030 1
A 1hexp(X (s)p) r (s) exp(? (9))
O 0 O 2
#2h exp(X2 (s)p2) r2 (s) exp(is(e))
2 __________P2 _(022
#2h exp(X 2 (s)12) 2 (s) exp(s
Since by A2.2.(iii)' the X's have positive density in an open
1 2
neighborhood, then the set of (P ,t)-evaluation points satisfying
this relationship has positive measure, violating A2.1.(ii)'.
If the X's are the same across risks so that X1 = X2 = X, then
the proof must be modified. The existence of a 9 which yields the
same probabilities implies that for all Xh(s) in an open neighborhood
in R,
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lim
40.O
Srlim
-.0
1 2
F(R (8, X,4) , R (e, x, 4) )- 1(I (0) ,2 (0) I)
4
F(R (9, X,4),R(a X,4) )- F( ' ( 2) (a ) )
4
Taking the limit,
F 1( (9),-2(9) Y) + b1 F2 OP1 (a),1P2 (e)
= d F 1(90),2( i) + e1 F2 (1 (80)'P2(00) I
where
p2h 2exp(X2 (s)p2) 72 (s)
plh 1exp(x1 (s)p8 ) ri (S)
Plh 1exp(X (s)pl) r(s)
1
ph exo(X2(s)p ) r(s)
2
P 1h 2 ( S) p ) (s)lh1 epx1(~l is
exp(t2 (9))
exp(-5 (0))
1
exp(P (e))
2
exp( (9))
s
exp OP(2 ))
exp(S (8) )
By A2.2. (iii)', the set of points satisfying this relation has
positive Lebesgue measure so that A2.1.(ii)' is violated.
e =
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Theorem 2.2 - Given A2.1'-A2.3', then almost surely a unique maximum
likelihood estimator satisfying 9N ' N N' N' N N
eventually exists and aN -+* *. Furthermore, XN(e - e0)
a -1
~ N(0,J(90) ).
Proof: A1.1'-A1.3' and the lemmas imply that all of the
consistency and asymptotic normality conditions of McFadden Theorems
2 and 3 are satisfied.
3. Conclusion
In this chapter I present an extension of the Ran and Hausman
technique for the semi-parametric estimation of single and competing
risk duration models to the important case where covariates vary over
time. While semi-parametric estimators for models with time-varying
covariates exist, they have previously been confined to the single
risk framework. In this chapter, identification and asymptotic
normality are demonstrated for the more general case.
In presenting a unified framework for single and competing risk
models, HH demonstrate a correspondence between semi-parametric
hazard models and existing discrete choice models. That result
carries over to the time-varying case, which reduces to the HH case
if variables are constant over time. The correspondence with
discrete choice models provides considerable advantages since there
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is a large literature on the properties and extensions of discrete
choice estimators which should provide directions for future
research. For example, existing non-parametric techniques for the
analysis of ordered discrete choice data may readily be applied.
The current discussion is restricted to demonstrating that the
semi-parametric time-varying model can be estimated and has the
standard maximum likelihood properties. The implementation of this
model should be straightforward, and an empirical application of this
technique is forthcoming. For computational reasons, some care
should be taken in distinguishing between covariates which do and do
not vary over time. For a model with a reasonable number of periods,
the number of calculations increases significantly with the inclusion
of time-varying covariates. The extra computational cost should be
weighed against the possibility of misspecification resulting from
treating covariates as constant over the entire duration.
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Appendix 1 - Linear regression model for single-risk hazards with
constant covariates.
The following transformation is well-known in the statistics
literature: see for example, Kalbfleisch and Prentice [1980] who
refer extensively to the regression format for the hazard model. For
the true p vector and given realizations on X, the density function
for the random variable for duration t is given by
(A1.1) ft(tlX,p) = h(t) H(t),
where
h(t) = A0 (t) exp(Xp),
H(t) = exp(-f h(s) ds).
Next, define a transformation on t to c where e is given by
(A1.2) e = g(t) =f h(s) ds
de = h(t) dt.
Transforming the random variable t to s yields:
(A1.3) f (6 XIp)
f (g1x,p) jjj
rft(t jX3 jct
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h(t) exp(-g(t)) h(t)'j
exp(-)
which is recognizable as the density function for a unit mean
exponential random variable.
A second change of variables produces the desired result.
Define a natural log transformation of e:
(Al.4) I1 = g() = log(E)
g 1(p) = exp(p)
dg' (p)I 1 (P) -= expQ(i).
Thus, transforming e to M yields the density function
(Al.5) f/I (pIjX,p)
t'0 (exp(p) |XIp) Ji
exp(-exp(p))) dg 1 (M)
exp(-exp(p)) exp(p)
exp(p - exp(p))
where the random variable p can be recognized as having an extreme
value distribution F (p) = 1 - exp(-exp(p)).
U
Using the definitions of E. and p yields
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(A1.6) = log(e)
log(f 0 h(s) ds)
=og(ft A (s) ds) + X10,
and it follows immediately that
(A1.7) Jog(f A (s) ds) = -Xp + p,
where p has an extreme value distribution as defined above.
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Appendix 2 - Linear regression model for proportional hazards,
non-time varying variables, with gamma heterogeneity.1
Consider first the case where the covariates are assumed to be
constant over time. The linear specification for the proportional
hazards model defined previously is
(A2.1) log f A (s) ds = -X) + e
where s has an extreme value distribution. Then taking exponentials,
(A2.2) H(t) exp(Xp) = exp(e)
where H(t) = f A(s) ds is the integrated hazard function.0 0
Now modify (A2.2) to allow for gamma heterogeneity by adding the
multiplicative error term exp(w)
(A2.3) H(t) exp(Xp) = exp(e + w)
This implies that the relationship given in (A2.1) holds with e
replaced by the error term (e + w). In this context, w corresponds
to the logarithm of the gamma variable defined by Lancaster [1979).
I am indebted to Aaron Han for showing me the form of this
derivation in the time-constant case.
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The estimation of this model requires knowledge of the
distribution of the new error term. Define 1(t) = H(t) exp(X3) and t
= exp(c + w), then rewrite (A2.3) as
(A2.4) I(t) = C .
Since 1(t) is monotonically increasing in t, the probability that the
failure time is greater than some value t is simply the integral of
the density of over the portion of the support of C that is greater
than 1(t). Using the form for the survivor function derived by
Lancaster (1979] and taking advantage of the correspondence between
models:
(A2.5) f t(s) ds = (1 + a2 ( -1/0
where a2 is the gamma variance. Differentiating both sides with
respect to I(t) gives
(A2.6) f ((t)) = (1 + 02 1(t)) 2+1)
Finally, applying a change of variables from ( back to
exp(c + w) gives the result, for 7 = e + w = log(I(t))
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(A2.7) f I() = (1 + o2 exp - -(1/0 +1)
so that the equivalent, regression form of the model (A2.1) with
gamma heterogeneity is
(A2.8) log ft A (s) ds = -Xp + i,
where the density function of -i is given in (A2.7).
For the case where the covariates vary over time, slightly
different notation is needed. The regression form of the model with
heterogeneity is given by
t
(A2.9) log ( z exp(X(i)p) f 1 A (s) ds) = . + w,
i=1
(A2.10) R(t) = exp(s + w) =
where the R(t) is analagous to the 1(t) in (A2.4). Thus, by
arguments similar to those given above, the density funciton of - =
+ w = log(R(t)) is given by (A2.7). The regression form of the
time-varying covariate model is then
t i
(A2.11) log ( z exp(X(i)p) f. A (s) ds) = t,
where -t has the density function given in (A2.7).
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Appendix 3 - Limits of integration for the bivariate competing risks
model with constant covariates.
This derivation also appears in Han and Hausman (1986] and is
the special, non-time varying case of the derivation in chapter 3 of
this thesis. The probability that a failure observed during the
interval (t-1,t] is of type 1 is given by the likelihood defined in
the text
1+ XpC 0
(A3.1) H(t) = f(e. 2 ) d 2 A dA
1 1t1- + Xa fg(e )
where g(e 1 ) is a function relating the error term s2 to 6 so that
the latent failure time of risk 2 is equal to the failure time for
risk 1 implied by the realization of e 0
To solve for the function g(.), first recall the linear
specification for the two hazards
1(A3.2) 1t = -X
12=
t X21 2 + 62
Since a failure of type 1 is observed at time t, the function
g(-) will be evaluated at all s in the interval (t-1,t). Following
Han and Hausman (1986], I assume linearity of the hazards for both
risks over discrete intervals. The regression form for the hazards
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given in (A3.2) can then be written, for arbitrary e* lying in the
interval (t-1,t], as
(A3.3) 11 = 1 11 ) +
t1 t t 1 - 1181  1
1 =(1 t-1 = -X2 2 + 2
where x = (e- t-1 t ft-1) gives the fraction of the interval
from (e t-1' t that e is greater that e Solving for e
* 1
(A3.3) t = 1
t ~ It-1
Applying the proportionality factor x to the second equality in
(A3.3) and then solving for e yields the function given in the text,
12 _ 22t t-1(A3.4) g(f) 12 + X2 p2 + 1 - (It- + X p1 ).
1 -1t-1t t-1
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